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Abstract 
American presidents and vice presidents can fail at properly supporting their armed 
forces by allowing the embezzlement of Department of Defense funds, disseminating defense-
related tweets without military advisor review, and not publicly endorsing naval deterrence 
operations. As the American taxpayer votes for the president, who is constitutionally the head of 
the military as the Commander-in-Chief, the taxpayer ultimately directs the military. The 
American public should understand how the highest elected officials fail to serve them and their 
armed forces. A gap in research exists regarding the presidential impact on the military due to 
the military’s apolitical nature. 
           This thesis attempts to add to the limited body of work regarding the relationship between 
the White House and the Department of Defense. The first contribution is the impact of public 
support on military operations, specifically naval deterrence. The chapter explores three case 
studies: Strait of Hormuz, Taiwan Strait, and South China Sea. Naval deterrence operations do 
not have the same level of success when the president does not officially endorse them. 
           The second contribution of this thesis is the lack of accountability of the executive branch 
and embezzlement from the Department of Defense. This chapter investigates three politicians: 
Vice President Richard Cheney (R), President Barack Obama (D), and President Donald Trump 
(R). Research finds that presidents and vice presidents can become kleptocratic through the 
Department of Defense when there is no accountability from the legislative or judicial branches. 
           The last contribution is the importance of recognizing that tweets are lawful orders with 
severe consequences on the Department of Defense. The chapter explores President Trump’s 
tweets aimed at North Korea, Iran, and transgender service members. Trump’s unique 
communication style should serve as a warning regarding the possible repercussions of removing 
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military advisors from reviewing official communication regarding the armed forces. Finally, the 
thesis provides recommendations for accountability of the president and vice president to support 
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Introduction 
The President of the United States (U.S.) often runs on a platform of supporting their 
troops, which is especially important as the Commander-in-Chief. However, the president and 
vice president can fail in supporting their military when it comes to international messaging that 
helps military operations, the use of the Department of Defense (DoD) budget for personal gain, 
and social media posts as lawful orders. Article 2 of the Constitution denotes the President as the 
Commander-in-Chief (CIC) of the world's most powerful military. As the U.S. evolved, so did 
the men who took office. When the Founding Fathers wrote the Constitution, most men had 
military experience, but now, that is not the case. The constitutional right to control the military 
offers the White House incredible power, although fewer presidents are veterans.  
Without a firm background in military culture, good order and discipline, and the 
required resources for operations, it is difficult to truly grasp how to support the troops without 
military advisors. Having military experience is not indicative of being a great CIC but 
understanding the inner workings of the armed forces provides greater context to decisions made 
at the highest level of government. When the president provides public support for military 
operations, namely naval deterrence, those operations have better outcomes and take troops out 
of harm’s way.  When the president divests from personal finances and does not embezzle 
money from the DoD, a larger portion of the DoD budget returns to resources available to troops. 
Lastly, when the presidential social media account posts, specifically Twitter, go through an 
arduous review process by military advisors, military personnel are better prepared to answer to 
those 280-character statements.  
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This thesis discusses how the President of the United States (POTUS) and Vice President 
(VP) can fail at properly supporting the military. The POTUS and VP contradict themselves in 
the common usage of “support the troops” when they, in fact, fail to do so on occasion.  The 
executive has a unique opportunity to directly impact over two million service members and 
DoD civilians through messaging and budget use. The president’s power over the Department 
often goes unchecked and can diminish the capabilities of the military.  
As arguably the most essential member of the United States Government and the head of 
the largest military globally, the CIC needs to be especially conscious of how their actions 
impact the DoD. Whether in social media or through the White House Press Office, their public 
messaging needs to echo the campaign sentiment of supporting the troops. Although a large 
military budget does not necessarily translate into more support for the troops, the embezzlement 
of taxpayer dollars would pique the public’s interest. Following the money and large defense 
contracts that may, in fact, enrich some elected to the highest offices, as well as some political 
appointees is important for the public to know and scrutinize along with their elected officials in 
Congress to ensure greater accountability. Otherwise, there is the potential for a growing 
kleptocratic and unconstitutional relationship between the POTUS, VP, and the military budget 
that continues largely unchecked.  
More and more elected officials, especially in the White House, do not have military 
experience. The Founding Fathers found it critical that the United States military be under 
civilian control, but during the writing of the Constitution, almost all men had military 
experience. The increased distance of politicians from military service leads to a 
misunderstanding of military culture, capabilities, and chain of command. While it is not a 
prerequisite for politicians to have military experience to lead effectively, it is vital to understand 
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the pitfalls to ensure proper checks and balances. The close examination between the relationship 
of the CIC and the DoD is critical to military operations’ continued success at home and abroad. 
The American Founding Fathers decided their novel country would always have civilian 
control. In article 2, section 2 of the Constitution, the authors appointed the president as the 
Commander-in-Chief, granting the powers to control the army and navy, and the national guard 
when called into service of the U.S.1 The civilian control ensured the military remained under 
democratic control, unlike the forefathers’ fight against King George III’s armies. These two 
objectives ensured the people could control the military through their vote by proxy of the 
president. While 29 of the 45 presidents have a military background, it is not a requirement for 
the highest office.2 Many scholars have explored the relationship between the civilian president 
and the control of their military. Three scholars, Samuel P. Huntington, Peter D. Feaver, and 
Peter W. Rodman all discuss the relationship between the two and the importance of the 
president’s military and political experience. 
First, Huntington discusses the increased relationship between the president and the 
military post-World War II. Before the attack on Pearl Harbor, the U.S. military was organized 
under the Joint Board, an advisory committee on operations and issues faced by the army and 
navy. The board included the secretaries of war and navy, the chiefs of staff, and their deputies. 
World War II led to the authorization by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to create the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff to replace the Joint Board. President Roosevelt encouraged the close relationship 
between his new Chief of Staff advisors, General Marshall and Admiral King, both personally 
 
1 U.S. Constitution, Art. 2, Sect. 2. 
2 Blaine Cain, “29 American Presidents Who Served in the Military,” Military, www.military.com/history/29-
american-presidents-from-military.html. 
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and professionally. Roosevelt saw “himself as a master strategist” and sought their nod that he 
could speak to the military officers’ advanced knowledge and experience.3 Both General 
Marshall and Admiral King still had the secretaries of army and navy, respectively, that offered 
further civilian control with the President. Due to his self-perception, Roosevelt later cut the 
civilian secretaries out of the conversation by directing their focus towards administrative and 
civilian issues.4 Roosevelt is known as drastically increasing the president's power during his 
time in office; moreover, creating a more substantial and familiar relationship between the 
highest office in the land and the highest-ranking military officers. 
Huntington’s civil-military theory suggests the necessity of civilian and military roles, 
and the military must maintain professionalism to achieve those roles. That professionalism 
requires the military to perform the required duties, especially those determined by elected 
officials. Regardless of the political party and the president’s background, the military has sworn 
an oath to serve the country and its leader. The military contributes to the strategic picture by 
advising the president, however, Huntington argues that the president should not interfere with 
military affairs and military autonomy.5 
In comparison, Rodman points to this unique relationship as being an issue. When 
comparing the United States to its closest ally, the United Kingdom, the president's journey lends 
little to no experience with the government or the military. The Prime Minister will have 
previous government experience, given that they must be a member of parliament.6 Although the 
 
3 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, 
MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 319. 
4 Ibid., 318-323. 
5 Ibid., 16-18. 
6 Peter D. Rodman, Presidential Command: Power, Leadership, and the Making of Foreign Policy from Richard 
Nixon to George W. Bush, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2009), 9. 
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CIC of the British Armed Forces is the head monarch, in this case, the Queen of England, the 
Prime Minister has the de facto executive authority over the military. This lack of guaranteed 
experience hurts the president, mostly as the CIC when the relationship remains close as 
Roosevelt intended. Additionally, Rodman states that America is at a further disadvantage with 
all new White House staff and cabinet appointees after every election, rather than the English 
civil servants whose career it is to advise the Prime Minister, regardless of party.7 
Feaver answers Rodman's concern by pointing to democratic theory that the people elect 
their president, knowing they will take command of the military. Furthermore, “The democratic 
imperative insists that this precedence applies even if civilians are woefully under equipped to 
understand the technical issues at stake. Regardless of how superior the military view of a 
situation may be, the civilian view trumps it.”8 As the elected official, the only person who can 
judge the society's risk is the president, even though the military might have the best experience 
to identify the risk. 
The three scholars provide ample reason for why the president, the elected representative 
of the people, should maintain civilian control over the military. However, Rodman and Feaver 
discuss how ill-equipped the president is at making those decisions due to inexperience. The 
expectation for the Joint Chiefs of Staff is to provide the requisite advice and assistance is part of 
serving their country; however, the inexperience and CIC title could interfere with decision-
making. Those decisions by the president have substantial impacts on military operations, and if 
advice is not heeded or misunderstood, it could have devastating consequences. As Huntington 
 
7 Rodman, Presidential Command, 12. 
8 Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2003), 153. 
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discusses, President Roosevelt felt he was equal when it came to a military understanding. His 
perception cut out other critical civilian control from the highest echelons of military planning. 
This standard led to the president’s, and in some cases, vice president's determination of the 
military operations, leading to an impact on the budget, personnel, and readiness.  
The first chapter explores the presidential messaging of naval deterrence operations. 
Deterrence operations are meant to demonstrate military power in the proximity of an adversary 
to stop them from advancing operations. Deterrence is one of the US Navy’s primary missions 
since World War II and has been used as justification for increasing the number of ships and 
weapons included in the DoD budget. The chapter explores three naval deterrence cases: South 
China Sea, Strait of Hormuz, and Taiwan Strait. The South China Sea case investigates how 
naval Freedom of Navigation (FON) operations under the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) attempts to deter Chinese artificial islands’ expansion. In the Strait of 
Hormuz’s case, the US Navy continues to deploy aircraft carriers at an almost constant rate. The 
consistent presence of the 5,000-personnel ship equipped with the most elite fighter jets and 
weapon technology acts as a reminder to Iran from trying to close the critical choke point. Lastly, 
the US Navy sends an assortment of naval vessels at random through the Taiwan Strait, an 
incredibly hostile waterway between Taiwan and China. The transit through the Taiwan Strait 
acts as a deterrent to China from any military aggression towards Taiwan. 
The chapter discusses the history of naval deterrence and how it has evolved from 1992 
under President Bill Clinton (D) to President Barack Obama (D) in 2016. The first scholar, Ugur 
Yetkin, argues navies should shape their maritime strategies by becoming more reactive than 
proactive. The less proactive a country’s navy then less conflict will exist in the maritime 
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environment; therefore, it acts as a deterrent. 9 In comparison, Brian Crisher and Mark Souva 
believe just the sheer size of a navy can act as a deterrent. The two argue that the adversary’s 
knowledge of another country’s navy will deter the adversary from taking action, as long as the 
navy publicizes its capabilities. Yetkin, Crisher, and Souva agree that kinetic effects are not 
necessary for proper deterrence in the maritime environment.  
The research agrees with Crisher and Souva that global leadership reacts positively to 
U.S. naval deterrence when the world understands the lethality and capabilities of the fleet. 
Moreover, research finds that naval deterrence operations are more successful when the president 
publicly acknowledges and endorses the operations. The White House publicly condemned any 
Iranian actions to cease maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. With the executive 
reinforcement in conjunction with aircraft carrier presence, deterrence operations have been 
successful. As for the Taiwan Strait, China and Taiwan are familiar with U.S. naval capabilities. 
When the White House endorsed the One China policy and the Taiwan Relations Act, the naval 
operations through the Strait solidified the support for both policies. However, in the case of the 
South China Sea, the U.S. presidential leadership has failed to publicly condemn the expansion 
of artificial islands. The U.S. navy continues to conduct operations in the vicinity, but China has 
continued to claim more sovereign territory in the South China Sea. The presidential public 
support of the naval operations helps reinforce the deterrence.  
The second chapter discusses how the president and vice president have an opportunity to 
become kleptocrats while in office with misuse of the military budget. Kleptocracy is using 
public office for personal gain and, in this case, the DoD. The Constitution’s Emoluments clause 
outlines explicitly that the president shall not make any profits other than their presidential 
 
9 Ugur Yetkin, "Revealing the Change in the Maritime Security Environment through Porter’s Five Forces 
Analysis," Defence Studies 13, no. 4(2013): 463. Military & Government Collection, EBSCOhost. 
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salary. The clause was written specifically to ensure there was no improper influence over the 
highest office in the land. The three case studies explore Dick Cheney, Barack Obama, and 
Donald Trump, who did not divest from their investments prior to entering office. First, Dick 
Cheney, the Vice President under George W. Bush, had ties to Halliburton, where he had been 
the Chief Executive Officer for several years. Consequently, when the Global War on Terror 
started in 2003, Halliburton received millions of no-bid contracts. Even while in office, Cheney 
maintained significant stock in the company, directly benefiting from the government contracts. 
Second, Barack Obama authored several books before his campaign for president. During his 
eight-year tenure as president, he made millions in profit from book sales. Lastly, Donald Trump 
maintained a close relationship with his company, the Trump Organization, and almost 
exclusively stayed at the Trump Organization’s resort properties when not at the White House. 
The decision to stay at these resorts ensured millions of dollars from the DoD would be spent at 
the properties.  
The second chapter explores three kleptocracy scholars, Mançur Olson, Susan Rose-
Ackerman, and Kelly Greenhill, all of which have their own criteria. Generally, kleptocracy is a 
form of corruption where the politician steals from their government for personal gain. Of the 
three, Olson’s definition of kleptocracy is the strictest by requiring the kleptocrat to make profits 
from taxation.10 The second scholar, Rose-Ackerman, requires kleptocrats to organize the 
government to maximize rents. This definition includes allowing the kleptocrat to allocate funds 
or award contracts that would make the highest profit for themselves.11 Lastly, Greenhill uses a 
 
10 Mançur Olson, “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development,” The American Political Science Review, no. 87 
(1993): 567-576. doi:10.2307/2938736. 
11 Susan Rose-Ackerman and Bonnie J. Palikfa, Corruption & Government: Causes, Consequences & Reform, 2nd 
ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 277. 
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four-part criterion to determine kleptocratic nature. Overall, Greenhill looks for private gain over 
the public good, a lack of legal accountability, and a mix of legal and illegal economic sources.12 
The second chapter uses Greenhill’s definition and criteria to assess the two former 
presidents and the vice president. The criteria finds that the POTUS and VP can make personal 
gains from their office with no history of accountability from the legislative branch. The lack of 
enforcement of the Emoluments clause has led to kleptocracy. Trump and Cheney fit three out of 
four of Greenhill’s requirements. Obama did not fit the definition of kleptocrat, although he did 
make personal profits from the books he authored prior to taking office.  
The third and final chapter examines the president’s social media, namely Twitter, and if 
tweets directed at the DoD harm the chain of command, good order and discipline, and creates 
chaos in the ranks. While Barack Obama was the first president to use Twitter and nicknamed 
the “Twitter President,” the chapter exclusively inspects Trump case studies. The three case 
studies discuss President Trump’s tweets towards Iran, North Korea, and the transgender ban. 
Part of Trump’s appeal to voters was his unusual communication style, especially the apparent 
unedited live stream of his thoughts. Trump’s Twitter use differed significantly from the polished 
tweets of his predecessor. In early 2020, President Trump authorized via Twitter to “shoot down 
and destroy” any Iranian vessels that harass US naval vessels after months of military 
escalation.13 The tweet differed from standing rules of engagement in the Strait of Hormuz. In 
late 2017, tensions increased with North Korea after the country started to test missiles near US 
allies. Trump tweeted his anger at the North Korean leader, Kim Jung Un, sometimes using 
 
12 Kelly M. Greenhill, “Kleptocratic Interdependence: Trafficking, Corruption, and the Marriage of Politics and 
Illicit Profits,” in Corruption, Global Security, and World Order, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Cambridge, MA: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2009), 98. 
13 Chandelis Duster, Nikki Caraval, “Trump on Twitter tells US Navy to 'shoot down and destroy' Iranian boats that 
harass US ships”, CNN, April 22, 2020, www.cnn.com/2020/04/22/politics/trump-us-navy-iranian-ships-tweet. 
 10 
playground nicknames. The last series of tweets directed at Kim included Trump declaring his 
possession of a working nuclear button. Lastly, in 2017, Trump announced that all transgender 
service members would not be allowed to join or stay in the military. Although the tweet 
referenced consultation with his military advisors, many officials stated they had been 
“blindsided” by the decision.  
Chapter three surveys three scholars, Scott Robertson, Stephen Frantzich, and Jefferey 
Peake, all of whom discuss political agenda setting in the media. Robertson first uses the 
framework of “Uses and Gratification” theory as to what needs are fulfilled by social media 
users. Moreover, politicians use the media to attempt to set the agenda, rather than subject to the 
news cycle.14 Frantzich takes Robertson’s framework one step further by stating politicians can 
manipulate the media by posting a diversion from undesirable news.15 In contrast, Peake states 
the White House is primarily reactive to the news cycle. Rather than agenda setting, the president 
agenda-surfs the cycle.16  
The third chapter uses the “Uses and Gratification” framework set by Robertson and 
found that the presidential tweets interfered with the DoD chain of command, specifically 
because military advisors did not review those tweets. In all of the Trump case studies, the tweets 
harmed the chain of command and good order and discipline of the armed forces. The Trump 
tweets fit the criteria set forth by Robertson as a means of personal gratification rather than 
establishing lawful orders directed at the military.  
 
14 Scott P. Robertson, Social Media and Civic Engagement, Morgan & Claypool Publishers, pg. 30, 
https://www-morganclaypool-com.proxy1.library.jhu.edu/doi/pdf/10.2200/S00836ED1V01Y201803HCI040. 
15  Stephen E. Frantzich, Presidents and the Media: The Communicator In Chief, pg. 7, Milton: Routledge, 2018. 
16 Jeffrey S. Peake "Presidential Agenda Setting in Foreign Policy." Political Research Quarterly 54, no. 1 (2001): 
69-86. Accessed February 28, 2021. doi:10.2307/449208. 
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Overall, the military needs consistent messaging that is not restricted to 280-characters. If 
future presidents continue to use Twitter as a means of dissemination, a review process should be 
in place. However, military matters are incredibly sensitive, and presidents should take extra 
precaution when addressing the DoD or other world leaders with military action. Additionally, 
the public response from the White House needs to support military operations for those 
operations to have the maximum impact. Without public backing from the CIC, naval deterrence 
loses its ability to impact its intended target fully. Lastly, the legislature needs to review 
presidential income and any profits that the president could potentially make. Enforcement of the 
Emoluments clause would help stop kleptocracy; moreover, a requirement for the POTUS and 
VP to divest from their finances while in office.  
This thesis is by no means an exhaustive series of executive infractions, but the research 
offers insight into what the military needs to operate effectively. The three chapters focuses on 
the threats to national security that come from the highest levels of government. Without 
exploring and acknowledging known threats, it will be nearly impossible to start the course of 
the unknown. Additionally, as veterans become a smaller part of the American population, so do 
the people who represent them. Starting with the CIC and the Vice President allows for an 
institutional shift to recognize the second and tertiary effects of their actions on military forces. It 
will enable the White House to start actually and directly support the troops through public 
messaging, social media, and the DoD budget. The executive and legislative elected leadership 
need to review the Constitution, standing foreign policies toward China and Taiwan, and what 
constitutes a lawful order to enforce them appropriately for effective use in supporting the 
military. 
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Chapter 1: Presidential Public Support and Naval Deterrence 
 
Introduction 
A primary use of the United States (U.S.) Navy for the last 242 years has been to deter 
the actions of adversaries through naval operations. Every Commander-in-Chief (CIC) has 
charged the Navy to carry out and enforce foreign policy; however, the Navy is unsuccessful in 
its deterrence mission when the CIC does not publicly support the operations. When deterrence 
is used outside the declaration of war, the U.S. Navy is not as successful in deterring adversaries’ 
actions as a means of enforcing executive branch policy when the president fails to publicly 
endorse them.  
Unlike other branches of the military, the U.S. Navy has the advantage of a highly mobile 
fleet, allowing the U.S. to place sovereign territory off of any oceanic coast in the world. The 
Navy is able to maintain this type of presence for weeks on end, as long as logistical support is 
provided by support vessels. Deterrence operations act as a reminder as to the American 
military’s capabilities outside of twelve nautical miles. Not only does it serve as a reminder, but 
it stops an adversary from advancing operations. Deterrence is one of the US Navy’s primary 
missions since World War II and has been used as justification for increasing the number of 
ships and weapons included in the DoD budget.  
The chapter first looks at a brief history of naval deterrence and its consequences. Then, a 
discussion of the U.S. naval strategy and its relation to President Bill Clinton’s (D), President 
George W. Bush’s (R), and President Barack Obama’s (D) foreign policy. The discussion 
specifically looks at how naval deterrence acts as an arm of the foreign policy under the three 
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presidents. The chapter uses three scholars, Ugur Yetkin, Brian Crisher, and Mark Souva, who 
have explored the topic of deterrence extensively.  
The chapter explores three naval deterrence cases: Strait of Hormuz, Taiwan Strait, and 
the South China Sea. In the Strait of Hormuz’s case, the US Navy continues to deploy aircraft 
carriers at an almost constant rate to deter Iran from closing the strait. For the Taiwan Strait, the 
U.S. sails through the Strait to emphasize its commitment to peaceful relations between China, 
Taiwan, and the U.S. Lastly, the South China Sea case investigates how naval Freedom of 
Navigation (FON) operations under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) attempts to deter Chinese artificial islands’ expansion. 
History of Naval Deterrence  
Naval operations have long been used for deterrence and projecting power against 
adversaries and to encourage those adversaries to abide by the desires of a country. Deterrence is 
defined as “a strategy designed to prevent one party from performing an unwanted action by 
reducing the benefits or heightening the potential costs of said action.”
17 
A notable U.S. naval 
operation to deter existential threat to American shores was the quarantine executed during the 
Cuban Missile Crisis. In July of 1962, at the height of the Cold War, U.S. intelligence 
determined the Soviet Union commenced moving tanks, guns, aircraft, and primarily missiles to 
Cuba. By October, Cuban missile capabilities increased threefold, and U.S. intelligence assessed 
the missiles could range almost anywhere in the United States.18 The Cuban government 
maintained the missiles on the island were only for defense, but President John F. Kennedy (D) 
 
17John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (New York: Cornell University Press, 1983), 14-15.  
18A. Denis Clift, "Ringside at the Missile Crisis," (U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 138, no. 10 (October 2012): 56-
62.   
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and his advisors saw it otherwise. As a result, the Joint Chiefs of Staff offered the President two 
military options: a naval blockade or a military strike.  
A naval blockade of Cuba would allow the U.S. to stop all incoming shipments of goods 
from the Soviet Union, in an attempt to isolate militarized resources. Additionally, the blockade 
process would buy the President decision space without pushing the Soviet Union to war. The 
other option-the military strike would ideally demolish all missile sites but likely result in a 
retaliatory action from the Soviet Union. Although it was considered an act of war, President 
Kennedy pursued the naval blockade and called it a “quarantine” to avoid the issue.19 Although 
the tensions rose with the threat of a nuclear war between the U.S. and USSR, an official 
declaration of war was never sent for congressional approval. The U.S. Navy deployed Russian 
speakers to every vessel in the Caribbean and used international signs to warn Soviet vessels 
from approaching the line of vessels. If the Soviets decided not to heed the warning, the U.S. 
Navy would fire warning shots across the bow and eventually through the rudder if initial 
attempts did not prove effective. Ultimately, the rules of engagement employed were left with 
the commanding officer of each vessel.   
A total of 140 American ships were used in the quarantine to stop the entry of any 
militarized shipments to Cuba.20 The naval quarantine successfully deterred the escalation of 
military action by both the Soviet Union and the U.S. No Soviet submarines or ships attempted to 
storm the line of American ships. Additionally, President Khrushchev agreed to withdraw 
military resources from Cuba, as long as the quarantine ended, and the U.S. vowed not to invade 
 
19 Clift, “Ringside at the Missile Crisis,” 58.   
20 Thomas B. Allen, "'Mr. President, The Navy Will Not Let You Down'," Naval History 26, no. 5 (2012): 16-23. 
International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center, EBSCOhost (accessed July 14, 2018).  
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Cuba.21 The naval quarantine proved an effective way to enforce an aspect of President 
Kennedy’s foreign policy. President Kennedy’s doctrine derived from the Roosevelt Corollary 
and containment theory which dictated the U.S. would intervene in any aggression in Latin  
America as the international police force, especially against European actors; even more so, if 
those powers had ties to communism.22 President Kennedy used the hybrid policy within the 
context of the growing threat of the communist Soviet Union and its mil-mil ties expansion to the  
Western Hemisphere, especially to a country only 90 miles off the coast of Florida. Although the 
Cold War marred Kennedy's tenure as president, the naval quarantine successfully deterred 
future Soviet Union strategic missile deployments to Cuba and reduced the likelihood of nuclear 
war between the two nations.   
Foreign Policy and Naval Strategy 
For the last thirty years, the U.S. Navy has used its maritime strategy to offer flexibility to 
the CIC while continuing its global dominance. Since 1992, the naval doctrine crafted closely 
followed the election cycle, allowing the Chief of Naval Operations to adapt to the President’s 
foreign policy intentions. A consistent component of each strategy includes deterrence of actions 
by adversaries in American self-interest and for this review, will only look at each strategy 
through the scope of deterrence. While deterrence is a significant pillar in all naval strategy, 
success is defined in this context by plateaued escalation or an adversary reversing its stance in 
accordance with each president’s doctrine. Following each strategy, this section will review 
criticism of deterrence through implementation or lack thereof.  
 
21 Clift, "Ringside at the Missile Crisis," 59.   
22 Serge Ricard, "The Roosevelt Corollary." Presidential Studies Quarterly 36, no. 1 (2006): 17-26.  
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In 1992, the Navy developed the “From the Sea” strategy, highlighting an overarching 
form of deterrence: power projection. Power projection as defined by the strategy,   
“Naval Forces maneuver from the sea using their dominance of littoral areas to 
mass forces rapidly and generate high intensity, precise offensive power at the time and 
location of their choosing under any weather conditions, day or night...requires mobility, 
flexibility, and technology to mass strength against weakness.”23    
  
As the Cold War had just ended, “From the Sea” looked to President Bill Clinton’s foreign 
policy and saw the call for a “doctrine of enlargement.” The doctrine included increasing 
democracies and free markets around the world, all the while committing to intervene in 
international problems when practical.24 As a result, the Navy downsized and focused towards 
littoral and amphibious capabilities. During the time of this strategy, the United Nations pursued 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) coming into law in 1994. The 
U.S. was a major contributor and drafter of the law, but Congress has yet to ratify.25 Among 
other laws, UNCLOS defined territorial waters, 12 nautical miles off a coast, and Exclusive 
Economic Zones (EEZ), as 200 nautical miles off of a coast.  
 The Navy downsized considerably during this period. The spending by the government 
by a percentage of the gross national product was the lowest since 1948.26  Military leaders 
warned of unpredictable actors after the fall of the Soviet Union and stressed the movement from 
global adversaries to regional objectives. The strategy shifted deterrence to a lower priority, and 
if conducted, it would be done by U.S. Marines Corps as part of a Naval Expeditionary Force. 
 
23 Department of the Navy, From the Sea, September 1992, www.navy.mil/navydata/policy/fromsea/fromsea.txt.  
24 Russell L. Riley, “Bill Clinton: Foreign Affairs,” UVA Miller Center, millercenter.org/president/clinton/foreign 
affairs.   
25 Ben Cardin, “The South China Sea Is the Reason the United States Must Ratify UNCLOS,” July 13, 2016, 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/13/the-south-china-sea-is-the-reason-the-united-states-must-ratify-unclos.  
26 Carl E. Mundy Jr., "Against the coping-stone of change: The Department of the Navy and the future," Marines 
23, no. 5 (1994): 16, MasterFILE Premier.  
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Rather than use the U.S. Navy as a deterrent to other navies’ actions, the strategy emphasized the 
influence of events ashore.27  
A drastic change occurred after September 11, 2001, which led to the unveiling of “Sea 
Power 2001” in 2002. The Chief of Naval Operations created the “Sea Shield” to focus on 
offensive power, defensive assurance, and joint operations. These objectives aimed to answer the 
demand for naval forces to deploy around the world to discourage any further actions taken 
against the U.S.28 The new strategy fell in line with President George W. Bush’s doctrine of 
preemptive strikes by potential enemies. Under this foreign policy, global adversaries knew the 
U.S. Navy would strike if intelligence suggested a threat, and the forward deployed presence and 
quick response under the strategy aimed to deter those actions. Additionally, “Sea Power 2001” 
added emphasis on information operations, especially the growing field of cyber operations and 
innovation to grow naval technological capabilities. The new warfare capabilities required an 
agile and technologically advanced force that could sustain long operations with little 
preparation.29 The strategy posed by the Chief of Naval Operations encouraged commanders to 
prepare for extended deployments as one of the greatest benefits of a large navy is the freedom to 
place U.S. sovereign territory off any coast and offer the President and their advisors time to 
contemplate further plans.    
Unlike “From the Sea” which focused on regional issues, the attack in 2001 broadened 
the horizon of naval operations and expanded its striking power. The decrease in funding after 
1994 hurt the active naval forces, and leaders demanded more than 300 ships for forward 
 
27 Mundy Jr., "Against the coping-stone of change,”16.  
28 Department of the Navy, Sea Power 21, by Vern Clark, October 2002, 
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presence.30 After the unveiling of the strategy, experts said the Navy was spread too thin and an 
increase in operations would harm people and equipment. The emphasis on new technology and 
ally engagement were tasked to bridge the gap between budget constraints and high operational 
tempo.    
In 2007, the Navy developed “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” 
(CS21) and returned to naval basics of forward presence, deterrence, sea patrol, power 
projection, maritime security, and humanitarian aid/disaster response.31 The strategy also stated a 
recommitment to allies if their self-interest was at risk. In addition to forward basing around the 
world, the Navy could quickly respond to any aggression to deter adversaries from committing to 
a costly decision. Critics of the strategy believed the document stripped the Navy of the 
responsibility of operations and put the onus on diplomatic relations, hardly a naval strategy. 
Leaders with kinetic effects felt the pendulum move away from what made the Navy a military 
force: hard power was not acknowledged as a key part of power projection. Kinetic effects are 
one of the Navy’s most dominant forms of deterrence, as a ship without a kinetic ability is just a 
sitting target.32 As a result of the criticism, the Secretary of the Navy stated, “Let there be no 
mistake, we are not walking away from, diminishing, or retreating in any way from those 
elements of hard power that win wars—or deter them from ever breaking out in the first place... 
The strength of a nation’s navy remains an essential measure of a great power status and role in 
the world.”33 CS-21 lacked the overarching acknowledgement of firepower for commanders to 
make decisions under the strategy.    
 
30 Department of the Navy, "'Sea Power 21' International Partnership For The Common Good," Naval Forces 25, 
no. 1(2004): 22-31, Military & Government Collection, EBSCOhost.  
31 Frank C. Pandolfe, "The Evolution of Modern U.S. Naval Strategy," Naval War College Review 69 (2016).   
32 Geoffrey Till, “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: A View from the Outside,” Naval War 
College Review 61, no. 2 (Spring 2008): 29.  
33 Donald C. Winter, 18th International Seapower Symposium, Naval War College, 18 October 2007.   
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What the strategy lacked in recognition of kinetic effects, it made up in the deterrence 
objective to specifically “deter and dissuade potential adversaries and peer competitors.”34 
During this time, recognition of a rising Asian threat and the Navy’s posture changed to upgrade 
the vessels stationed in Guam and Japan, the Pacific theater’s forward operating bases. Vessels 
were moved from the Atlantic Fleet to the Pacific Fleet with the newest capabilities in order to 
reinforce the commitment to timely deterrence.35 In the same breath, the Navy had committed to 
peaceful resolution of sovereignty claims in accordance with international law and encouraged 
allies to act in the same manner. The U.S. Navy could act as a world police force but working 
with allies would benefit from long-term success and more accountability from other world 
forces.36    
Under President Barack Obama in 2015, the Chief of Naval Operations published “CS-21 
Revised.” CS-21R was the first overarching naval strategy to state the difference between types 
of deterrence. Nuclear deterrence typically points to the nuclear ballistic missiles submarines as a 
constantly deployed asset to display the potential cost of an adversary’s aggression. As for 
conventional deterrence, the strategy pointed to the use of non-nuclear vessels, especially 
through the use of large carrier strike groups. Each strike group typically deploys with a cruiser, 
two destroyers, an attack submarine, and an air wing.37 The strategy specifically points to several 
threats to naval dominance, China, Russia, and Iran, as a threat to American and ally interests. 
President Obama stated, “We will engage, but we preserve all our capabilities” and has since 
 
34 John F. Bradford, "The Maritime Strategy of the United States: Implications for Indo-Pacific Sea Lanes, 
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Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center, EBSCOhost.  
35 Ibid.,192.  
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37 Department of the Navy, A Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century Seapower, March 2015, 
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used this statement to guide his foreign policy.38 Obama used diplomacy to engage world leaders 
and tried to preserve military superiority when engagement did not work. The CS-21R 
complimented the strategy by continuing to grow naval capabilities, building relationships with 
allies, and striving to ensure stability through presence, but maintaining options for the  
Commander-in-Chief.   
While the strategy lent itself to wherever the President needed a naval presence, the 
document specifically discussed China as a growing threat. CS-21R did not outline every  
Chinese capability and intention but alluded to problems Americans could face if the People’s 
Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) did not slow its growth. The strategy neglected to acknowledge 
the PLAN pushing the U.S. Navy out from the Asia-Pacific region. By not using this platform to 
bring attention to the current Chinese threat to regional goals detracts from the overall American 
objective to deter the PLAN from aggressive behaviors.39 As a guiding document for 
commanders, the lack of guidance refused to identify tomorrow’s problems.  
Literature Review 
Ugur Yetkin used a version of Porter’s Five Forces Analysis to determine the evolution of 
maritime security. Porter’s Five Force is often used for business strategy, but Yetkin transforms 
the analysis to have the power of buyers equate to the international and domestic public, 
suppliers as defense industry and human capital, threat of entrance to the market as other global 
navies, the threat of substitute products as the army, air force, or other peaceful means, with all 
variables as inputs into the rivalry among existing competitors contributing to each navies’ 
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mission.40 The rivalry among existing competitors determines how navies should shape strategy 
in order to accommodate the other four variables, “by being a less provocative force, a navy can 
be used effectively to deter the enemy without any major conflict or only with a limited one.”41 
Yetkin points to the superpower abilities of the U.S. Navy after the Cold War, but despite the 
Navy’s status, the strategy includes depending on allies for maritime success.42    
Brian Crisher and Mark Souva determine the strength of navies by examining the kinetic 
ability to destroy resources, whether vessels or humans and the size of the ship by tonnage.43 The 
more strength a navy has within its fleet, the larger a deterrent it will be to a competitor. The 
results determined that while some countries invest in aircraft carriers, like the US and Great 
Britain, other countries can counter the strength through ballistic submarines, like Russia.44  
Deterrence can be enforced by any vessel, just as long as the perception of the adversary portrays 
the lethality of provoking the threat.    
  The U.S. Navy has depended on deterrence to prevent wars from starting and to showcase 
the powerful capabilities that can sit off the coast of foreign shores. The president, as the 
Commander-in-Chief, determines goals for their foreign policy through creating an all-
encompassing doctrine, which directly impacts the Navy’s strategies. As a consequence, naval 
strategies since 1992 continued to form in the mold of the President’s goals overseas. Deterrence, 
while a consistent objective, initially saw a decrease in demand during President Clinton’s 
tenure. The attacks on September 11 led to a reevaluation of military capabilities with an 
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emphasis on intelligence and the ability to move the largest ship in the fleet, an aircraft carrier, to 
demonstrate power. In 2007, President George W. Bush determined that forward presence 
through overseas basing demonstrated the aptitude to respond to any rising problem, whether a 
necessity for humanitarian aid or a threat from an adversary. President Obama’s time in office 
saw the specificity in the type of deterrence used, conventional or nuclear, reemphasizing the 
capabilities the U.S. Navy vessels maintain and the purpose of them.    
Throughout the last 26 years, naval deterrence capabilities have evolved with the 
strategies that stem from the commander’s intent but only reach full potential when messaging 
matched the operations. American treaty allies expect their relationships to garner a military 
presence when violated by an adversary. The U.S. Navy has not been able to maintain a healthy 
fleet for the last 26 years, after hitting a modern all-time low of 280 vessels manned by such 
fatigued sailors that two fatal collisions occurred over a one-year period. To the contrary, United  
States’ naval deterrence operations have achieved success in stopping or reversing an adversary’s 
actions per presidential policy when the White House acknowledged and publicly supported the 
operations.   
  The U.S. Navy consistently supported foreign policy throughout the world, but nowhere 
as frequently as the Strait of Hormuz, the Taiwan Strait, and the South China Sea. These bodies 
of water have had significant manpower and operations dedicated to their development through 
naval deterrence, all for very different reasons and projecting all different messages. The case 
studies will explore the importance of these regions to American interests, how the Navy 
conducts deterrence, the legal actions taken by an adversary, and the public support from the 
White House.   
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The Message of Deterrence 
In the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the definition of the naval operations was in the 
eye of the beholder, whether it was a blockade or a quarantine, the rules of engagement did not 
change. While creating strategies to prioritize and drive a force is necessary, the strategies have 
neglected to address the changing global environment thoroughly. Strategies since the 1990s fail 
to address issues without borders and multilateral disputes. In Asia specifically, concerns of a 
renewed Russian naval power, China’s rising strength, and the almost constant threat of North 
Korea failed to be addressed by naval operations.45 This type of potential conflict from several 
countries means deterrence is not as potent and clear-cut as the Cuban Missile Crisis; however, 
deterrence needs careful assessment for each operation and country in order to achieve success.   
 The ambiguity of deterrence and a heightened presence in a single place of tension to 
deter an adversary could lead to a miscalculation with a high potential for escalation.46 For 
successful deterrence, the U.S. needs to make its intentions and desires clear to the adversary. 
Without a clear message for what the strategy hopes to achieve, deterrence can be seen as 
aggression and escalate tensions. The naval operations should match the rhetoric of the White 
House or the leadership of the Chief of Naval Operations to prevent the conclusion that the U.S. 
is attempting to escalate a conflict.   
American Allies 
  Reaffirming American commitments to allies is crucial to each naval strategy and ensures 
the long-term success of all foreign policy.47 With deterrence as a significant component of naval 
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strategy and with treaties to uphold, the U.S. needs to honor the promises by treating allies’ 
sovereignty as its own. For example, the Philippines have the Mutual Defense Treaty with the 
U.S., which requires both countries to come to the aid of the other. However, the Philippines 
have reefs within the EEZ and have come under attack by China. The treaty promised the U.S. 
would aid the Philippines in such aggression, yet the U.S. has taken no official stance on the 
matter, let alone come to the defense of the ally. This example of the lack of deterrence, not even 
a retaliatory operation, reminds allies that America is a fair-weather friend and will pick and 
choose in which instance maritime deterrence is worth American military resources.    
 Not only are ally expectations blurry, but the U.S. Navy budget cannot support deterrence 
operations in all cases. The size of the U.S. Navy has shrunk significantly from the 740-ship 
navy in World War II to less than 300 ships. The sheer number of ships do not necessarily 
capture the abilities of the fleet, considering the constant technological upgrade.48 The Navy does 
have intentions to grow the fleet by 46 ships in the next five years, with an increase of 25,000 
recruits at the same time.49 Although the ships have notable capability advancements, the 
operational tempo has been challenging to sustain. Deployments range from six to eight months 
with most sailors working one-hundred-hour weeks. The tempo has seen 17 fatalities in the 
Pacific Fleet with the collisions of the USS Fitzgerald and the USS McCain in 2017.    
Not only is the fleet smaller, but funding to the military has ebbed and flowed with wars.  
In 1992, the military allocated 4.66% of the Gross Domestic Product towards the military, by 
1998, it was almost half that at 2.90%. In 2010, the budget had returned to 1992 standards, but 
since the height of the conflict in the Middle East, the allocation has returned to about 3% of the 
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GDP in 2017.50 Without the budget to support the basic defense of American coastlines and 
interests, the ability to deter the actions of allies’ adversaries will not be possible to sustain 
consistently.   
Case Study: Strait of Hormuz 
The Strait of Hormuz is a critical choke point through which approximately 40% of the 
world’s oil supplies are transported.51 The water feature is as narrow as 22 miles and serves as 
the gateway to the Persian Gulf from the Arabian Sea, and if interfered or blocked, could have 
devastating ripple effects around the world. Moreover, the two available shipping lanes are only 
five miles across, making maneuvering very difficult. Iran maintains primary control over the 
Strait and has often used their ability to place mines, block, or interfere with the Strait as a 
constant threat.   
In 1988, a U.S. Frigate hit four Iranian mines while transiting through the Strait and as a 
result, the U.S. faced this incident by developing Operation Praying Mantis, a one-day event that 
demonstrated the ire of Washington. Naval forces initially targeted Iranian frigates, however, by 
the end of the operation, almost half of all Iranian maritime capabilities were destroyed.52  The 
last major naval event during this time was the USS Vincennes’ incorrect targeting of an Iranian 
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In 2007, tensions come to a boil once again when Iran conducted one of its largest naval 
exercises. The U.S. decided to place two U.S. Carrier Strike Groups in the region as a result of 
the increase of Iranian naval forces.54 Not only did the Iranian exercise occur, but the start of 
Iranian nuclear capabilities started to develop, escalating the regional tensions. The next year, 
tensions increased further after three U.S. naval vessels were harassed through swarming 
techniques, the use of multiple smaller vessels to quickly approach larger ships to escalate 
postures and demonstrate weapons capabilities.55    
In 2011, the USS John Stennis Carrier Strike Group operated legally through the Strait 
during another Iranian exercise. One of the top Iranian admirals threatened the Navy that if the 
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operations continued, the U.S. would see consequences. Although widely acknowledged that it is 
not in the best interest of Iran, it threatened the use of mine operations and the closing of the 
Strait to maintain power. As a result of the threats, the U.S. Navy and its leaders have gone on 
the record to state the “red line” of closing the Strait.    
Since the instance of the dual carrier operations, the presence of a carrier transiting this 
location has become more common as a means of deterrence. U.S. Fifth Fleet, the naval 
headquarters responsible for the waters for the Gulf of Oman, Persian Gulf, Gulf of Aden, Red  
Sea, and the Arabian Sea and headquartered in Bahrain, resides only 370 miles from the Strait. In 
2011, Fifth Fleet determined the need for keeping an average of 1.7 carriers on station over the 
course of the year.56 The U.S. maintains 11 carriers, and considering deployment cycles to train, 
replenish, and make the necessary changes to the carrier and all of its accompanying vessels, 
holding a 1.7 presence demonstrates the high priority of the choke point and the commitment to 
American and ally commerce transiting through the body of water.  
 In 2016, the U.S. Navy found itself in another problematic situation when Iran captured 
two small patrol boats with ten American sailors on board for trespassing on territorial waters.57  
The GPS equipment failed, and the two vessels floated a mile into Iranian waters. While the 
sailors were released a few days later, it was not without creating an international 
embarrassment. Even after this incident, the U.S. decided to maintain the high presence of naval 
vessels in the region.  
   
 
56 "Washington's Gunboat Diplomacy and the Strait of Hormuz," Stratfor Geopolitical Diary 12(2012) Business 
Source Complete, EBSCOhost.  
57 Helene Cooper and David E. Sanger, "Iran Seizes U.S. Sailors Amid Claims of Spying," The New York Times, 
January 12, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/13/world/middleeast/iran-holds-us-navy-boats-crew.html.  
 28 
Case Study: Taiwan Strait 
The Taiwan Strait resides in the East China Sea, about eighty miles at its most narrow 
point between the two coastlines of the Republic of China (Taiwan) and People’s Republic of 
China (PRC). The Taiwan Strait has been subject to a long history of naval aggression between 
the two countries. While Taiwan has enjoyed semi-independence since 1945, the U.S. adopted 
the One China policy in 1979 as a result of growing tensions between the three countries. The 
U.S. maintained diplomatic ties with Beijing and honored the goal of peaceful reunification 
between the PRC and Taiwan, but also maintained trade agreements with Taiwan. After the One 
China policy took effect, the U.S. passed the Taiwan Relations Act, allowing the U.S. to sell 
Taiwan the weapons necessary for the island to defend itself.58  The unofficial relationship 
between the U.S. and Taiwan acts as a considerable deterrent of Chinese hostility, and one of the 
more apparent manifestations of this trilateral relationship takes place in the Taiwan Strait. Most 




58 "What Is the 'One China' Policy?" BBC News, February 10, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-
china38285354.  
59 John Fuh-sheng Hsieh, "Cross-Strait Relations in the Aftermath of Taiwan's 2016 Elections," Journal Of Chinese 
Political Science 22, no. 1: 1-15(2017), Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost.  
  
 29 
 In the 1950s, the Strait experienced two distinct acts of Chinese aggression when the  
PRC bombed two Taiwanese held islands in the Strait, in what became known as the Taiwan 
Strait Crises. The U.S. feared the Korean War would extend to Taiwan and the PRC, so the U.S. 
put forces in the Strait to encourage peace. Although the allocation of American naval forces in 
close proximity to the PRC raised tensions, the PRC continued to pursue conquering smaller 
islands in the Strait.60 The smaller islands were not formally included in the Taiwan Relations  
Act, but the U.S. reiterated it would assist in the protection of Taiwan and the small islands, if the 
PRC continued to act with aggression. Mao Zedong eventually stopped the bombing of the smaller 
islands and the PRC pursued a peaceful resolution.   
 Only small skirmishes took place in the Strait until 1995 when the PRC launched several 
missiles that landed off the coast of Taiwan and deployed amphibious vessels into the Strait. The 
U.S. reacted by sending two carrier strike groups to the area. At this time, the U.S. was the only 
country with a “carrier monopoly,” and the strait transit acted as a massive deterrent to PRC’s 
intervention. As the area simmered after the presence of the strike groups, the U.S. issued a “dual 
deterrence” warning to both Taipei and Beijing. Since 1996, the U.S. has maintained a naval 
presence in the area.    
 In 2007, the U.S. sent the USS Kitty Hawk, an aircraft carrier, through the Strait after it 
was denied entry into a Chinese port of Hong Kong. The transit after the denial served as a 
reminder to the agreement of the One China policy and the desire for peace. U.S. officials 
pointed to weather avoidance as the reason to transit, but this façade had no impact on the 
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Chinese reaction. The Chinese attempted to rescind the denial of service and stated the U.S. was 
always welcome.61  
  The U.S. has not sent another carrier strike group through the Strait since 2007 but 
continues to send smaller vessels like destroyers through on an annual basis.62 While the  
PRC views the transits as an increase in aggression by the US, the deterrence of the strait transits 
and freedom of navigation operations allow for a peaceful reminder as to both the One China 
policy and the Taiwan Relations Act.    
Case Study: South China Sea 
The growing presence of the PRC’s creation of artificial islands on top of reefs in the 
South China Sea (SCS) has created an international nightmare and the U.S. has tasked the Navy 
to deter the building of additional islands. Naval operations started in 2001 and increased 
strength in 2015 as China continued to expand their claim of the massive body of water through 
the building of artificial islands. Six other countries have stronger claims to the reefs, but with 
China’s overwhelming budget and human resources to continue the construction, the other 
claimants have been bullied out of the water.    
China seized the opportunity in 1947 to claim most of the region in what is called the 
“nine-dash line,” an unspecified boundary with no precise latitude and longitudinal coordinates.63 
Within the boundary are hundreds of shallow reefs that are home to millions of schools of fish, 
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untapped oil, and some of the busiest sea lanes in the world. Since the 1970s, the PRC has started 
to build on reefs that are hundreds of miles from China’s mainland, developing new islands for 
military and civilian use.64 This conflict in the region ignited by the PRC led to decades of legal, 
economic, and military issues with the U.S. Navy as the primary deterrent to the PRC to cease 
their building of the artificial islands.   
Figure 1-3 
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While the U.S. resides thousands of miles away from the region, American military 
forces, especially the Navy, have a large footprint there. The U.S. does not take an official stance 
on the territorial dispute, but with trillions of dollars’ worth of trade transported through these 
waters annually, the U.S. decided to increase the military presence. The primary means of naval 
operations in SCS is through a Freedom of Navigation Operation (FONOP) as a way to enforce 
international maritime law, the safety of navigation, and allegiance to U.S. allies. A FONOP is 
defined as entering within 12 nautical miles of a sovereign landmass without consent. Under the 
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conditions of the FONOP, the Navy and their commanders are only able to do so much without 
posing a significant risk of starting a war.65      
With the South China Sea containing many shipping lanes, a US military presence is 
almost constant, with carrier strike groups navigating through the waters biannually. While the 
primary vessel for FONOPs is destroyers, carriers operating in the area have been found to 
participate in exercises with allies, reminding the PRC of the consequences of further growth in 
the Sea. Since 2001, the artificial islands of the South China Sea have grown exponentially, even 
with the FONOPs deterrent operations.    
Law Impacts on the Case Studies 
  To legally justify U.S. naval operations, the U.S. points to the United Nations Convention 
of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) for determination of legalities around the world. The U.S. was 
instrumental in helping formulate the law but has not ratified it. One of the primary goals of 
UNCLOS was to determine the definition of territorial waters, EEZ, unique waterways, and the 
implementation of freedom of navigation.  
  The Strait of Hormuz is incredibly unique given the narrow waterway and the fact the Strait 
resides in the territorial waters of Iran and Oman.66 With half of the Strait in Iran’s territorial 
waters, it is still illegal for the country to form a blockade in peacetime. UNCLOS maintains that 
a blockade of any sort is an act of war, and Iran has been in peacetime since 1988 at the 
conclusion of the Iran-Iraq War.   
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The Taiwan Strait is not narrow enough to share territorial waters with both the PRC and 
Taiwan, but the two countries share an exclusive economic zone. While the use of fishing and 
resources in the Strait have not been a topic of contention, the ability to navigate and use the  
Strait has led to high tensions between the PRC, Taiwan, and the U.S. In 1995, the PRC used the 
Strait for missile tests directed at Taiwanese islands. UNCLOS maintains that any action in the 
Strait, while not in the high seas due to the EEZ, must “refrain from any threat or use of force 
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of States bordering the 
strait, or in any other manner in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the 
Charter of the United Nations.”67 While the PRC states the same rights as a state with a border of 
the Strait, it infringed on the right of Taiwan through the use of missile testing. PRC, and by 
proxy, Taiwan, are subject to UNCLOS as they are signatories.     
UNCLOS does not recognize any reefs as a landmass, preventing PRC to legally claim an 
EEZ or territorial waters from PRC’s artificial islands. An EEZ allows the sovereign country to 
own all resources within 200 nautical miles of the coast. This is significant because China’s 
territorial claim extends more than six hundred miles south of the mainland, thus creating an 
extension of claims. Similar to the EEZ, UNCLOS recognizes sovereign territorial waters as 12 
nautical miles off the coast of a country, this restricts any other country coming within those 
waters without previously receiving permission.68 This greatly restricts the travel of any ships 
traveling through the waters, as it could be seen as an act of war. In the eyes of the United 
Nations, China’s man-made land does not qualify for this right.    
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In 2013, the Philippines brought China to the Permanent Court of Arbitration to discuss 
the legality of the expansion using UNCLOS as the base for argument. The Philippines, a 
claimant a portion of the reefs, has been dramatically affected by China’s expansion and the  
Philippines’ resources, especially fishing, has left the Philippines arguing the rights of the EEZ. 
In 2017, the Permanent Court of Arbitration decided the nine-dash line as a non-existent 
boundary with no rights to the resources and the construction of the reefs are illegal.69  Since the 
decision, China does not abide by the ruling and continues to build and steal resources. 
Density of Naval Support 
  U.S. Fifth Fleet, headquartered in Bahrain, maintains the 1.7 carrier strike group (CSG) 
presence for the high-tension area. The CSG presence by itself is a naval fleet more capable than 
most countries’ navies. The ability to launch highly capable and powerful aircraft off the coast of 
almost any country acts as a massive deterrent to any adverse actions. In addition to the 
commitment to the CSG presence, Bahrain has four mine countermeasure vessels, as a major 
secondary threat from Iran is the use of mines throughout the choke point by Iran.  
  The East and South China Sea fall within the domain of U.S. Seventh Fleet, headquartered in 
Yokosuka, Japan. The presence through the Taiwan Strait is significantly lower than the Strait of 
Hormuz, with only annual transits by smaller vessels and no CSG transit since 2007. Japan 
boasts of two major naval bases, Sasebo and Yokosuka, and one CSG homeported in the 
Yokosuka, so if there was a need for presence, the US Navy could provide it in few days’ time.  
 The South China Sea has significant shipping lanes, of which, the U.S. Navy is charged with 
protecting American and ally commerce. CSG operations happen on a biannual basis, while 
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sometimes conducting exercises with nearby allies, like Australia. Smaller American naval 
vessels, like cruisers and destroyers, will conduct FONOPs sporadically throughout the year and 
just the consistent presence is considered part of the deterrence operations.    
Support from the White House  
  The public support and acknowledgment of naval operations, especially deterrence, are 
critical to the success of the greater strategy to support foreign policy. Without a clear message 
that directly correlates to the military actions could appear disjointed and without a real cause.   
The White House consistently sends the message that the U.S. will not tolerate the 
closing of the Strait of Hormuz. After the skirmish in 2007, White House officials offered a 
grave warning against any further threats of U.S. naval vessels.70 The same stance continued 
through 2012, when Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta warned, “We have made very clear that 
the United States will not tolerate blocking of the Straits of Hormuz. That’s another red line for 
us— and that we will respond to that.”71 Furthering the sentiment, the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, stated he would not hesitate to use military means to 
reopen the Strait if Iran closed it.72  
The relationship between the U.S., Taiwan, and the PRC is an incredible balance of 
strategic ambiguity. The U.S. maintains a relationship with both countries, committed to the One 
China policy and the Taiwan Relations Act, but does not speak publicly on the relations if  
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Taiwan would declare complete independence or China invaded Taiwan. After the escalation in 
1995, the strategy shifted to “dual deterrence.” The incident highlighted perceptions of American 
intentions, forcing Assistant Defense Secretary Joseph Nye to remark, “The Americans do not 
want to give Taiwan a 100 percent guarantee that no matter what Taiwan does, the Americans 
will come to its defense, because that would encourage Taiwan to take actions that would be 
risky.”73 On the other hand, acknowledging the perception that America would not defend 
Taiwan, China would have no hesitation to target Taiwan. Although the White House has not 
officially remarked on the transits through the Taiwan Strait, an action so infrequent would need 
approval from the highest office. The lack of statements consistently contributes to the standing 
policy to stay on the median between the two countries and the transits portray this message to 
the full extent.    
When it comes to the South China Sea, the Navy has not received any explicit 
reassurance or acknowledgement of the operations from the White House, unlike the Strait of 
Hormuz and the Taiwan Strait. The White House press releases have lacked clear language that 
acknowledges the distrust in the region. The U.S. states it does not have an official stance on the 
region but pursues the FONOPs to counter the PRC’s illegal actions against UNCLOS. In 2015, 
the Obama Administration was pressed on the issues in the South China Sea by the PRC, so the 
Secretary of State, John Kerry, delayed the operations to appease Beijing.74 The lack of clear 
direction, especially a month before a meeting with President Xi Jinping, proved the lack of 
direction and commitment to the operations. Additionally, to support the operations in the South 
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China Sea, the White House press should publicly acknowledge and condemn the actions, 
without those, it will be difficult to create pressure from around the world. To put it simply,  
“Whether at sea or otherwise, lack of clarity is harmful to the rule of law.”75 Not only do the 
messages from the highest office give no guidance, but every time when a destroyer conducts a  
FONOP, it conducted by “innocent passage,” rather than a more provocative passage that would 
truly demonstrate the illegal claims made by the PRC.76 In order to make the FONOP more 
effective, many argue, the destroyers should launch aircraft and operate in a normal posture 
while within the PRC claimed territorial waters. Without this, Washington essentially concurs 
with the Chinese claim.  
Relationship with Allies and Other Countries  
 The Strait of Hormuz serves as the gateway to the Persian Gulf, where Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia, Iraq, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Iran all have a coastline and depend on the 
Gulf for trade. The U.S. has a significant presence with overseas bases in Bahrain, Kuwait, and 
Qatar, and port ties with the United Arab Emirates. The exportation of oil and importation of food 
and other goods through the Strait serves as a lifeline with costly substitutes. The U.S. presence in 
this theater had little high-level leadership representation until 1995 when Fifth Fleet reactivated 
after almost fifty years.77 Although the “From the Sea” strategy saw an overall decrease in the size 
of the U.S. Navy, leadership saw a need for increased presence throughout the region. U.S. allies, 
especially Great Britain, increased their role in the region through increased naval presence as 
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well. Similar to the capture of the ten U.S. sailors in 2016, Iran seized 15 Britons while on patrol 
and drifted into Iranian territorial waters.78 Iran does not discriminate against America and her 
allies when it comes to accidental actions in the controversial waters.   
 Joint exercises have been a substantial method to demonstrate deterrence with the added 
benefit of improving relations with partners, specifically in the Persian Gulf. The U.S. routinely 
conducts exercises with Great Britain and Australia, and occasionally with France.79 Conducting 
these operations with allies sends a joint message to Iran regarding the importance of the region, 
and the possible consequences the country will need to face if the Strait closes for any amount of 
time.  
The U.S. maintains security commitments to many of Iran’s neighbors, although it does 
not have a mutual defense agreement with any of the littoral countries.80 The allocation of 
military personnel in these critical countries prove the dedication to the freedom of navigation 
mission and ensure safe passage for all vessels.    
The Taiwan Strait needs the continued reminder of allegiance and commitment to the 
Taiwan Relations Act. Although some believe it would be easier to give up the stance of 
supporting Taiwan through defense, it is critical to maintaining the relations after the 2011 “pivot 
to Asia.”81 Without maintaining this commitment, the U.S. loses credibility. Taiwan also relies 
on Japanese relations; moreover, both expect the U.S. to continue to assist in the defense against 
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Chinese aggression. If the U.S. fails to maintain a defense of Taiwan interests, other alliances in 
the region will crumble like Japan and the Philippines.    
Similar to the Taiwan Strait, if the U.S. does not publicly back the allies’ who are subject 
to the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, the U.S. will lose credibility. The naval 
operations could see greater success if the Navy invited non-claimant allies to participate in the 
operations as the regional commitment to a peaceful result. Additionally, the U.S. could utilize 
major naval exercises, like Rim of the Pacific, as an incentive to cease the militarization of the 
artificial islands to follow the UNCLOS ruling. This recommendation was heeded in 2018 when 
China found their invitation rescinded after the Trump Administration's growing concerns over 
electronic warfare equipment and possible surface-to-air missiles moving to the South China 
Sea.82  
The U.S. Navy presence in the South China Sea not only projects power to the PRC but 
assures allies of agreements and the emphasis on the region.83 Although the relationship between 
the U.S. and the Philippines have evolved since President Duterte took office, the U.S. maintains 
the Mutual Defense Treaty, providing defense measures to ensure the protection of the 
Philippines. While the U.S. does not have similar agreements with other claimant countries, the 
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Success of Naval Deterrence  
  In the case of the Strait of Hormuz, some feel that CS-21 strategy specifically pointed to 
the region when in regard to,   
“We will not permit conditions under which our maritime forces would be impeded from 
freedom of maneuver and freedom of access, nor will we permit an adversary to disrupt 
the global supply chain by attempting to block vital sea-lines of communication and 
commerce. We will be able to impose local sea control wherever necessary, ideally in 
concert with friends and allies, but by ourselves if we must.”85   
  
Since 2007, Iran has failed in making good on their threats, while the U.S. Navy has played a 
significant role in ensuring the freedom of navigation through the Strait. The U.S. Navy and the 
Iranian conflict followed the CS-21R strategy closely: allies continued exercises and presence in 
the region and was cemented by the 1.7 CSG presence. The White House has kept a hardline 
stance against the closure of the Strait throughout several presidencies, which has reinforced the 
naval operations in the region. Overall, the U.S. Navy has succeeded with only a few blemishes 
in deterring the Iranian Navies from creating a blockade through the fragile waters. While there 
are other threats the U.S. Navy needs to be aware of, like mining in the area and the small boat  
“swarming” technique, the primary objective to stop the advancement and escalation of the 
surrounding areas have effectively been accomplished.86   
  The Taiwan Strait, with one high point of tension in the last thirty years, has remained 
peaceful. The use of the U.S. Navy as a buffer between the PRC and Taiwan was highlighted by 
the actions of the two CSGs.87 Under the “From the Sea” strategy, the strait transits were 
necessary and practical, following the outline of the strategy, to insert American dominance into 
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the area. With the transition to newer strategies like CS-21, a goal of stopping outbreaks of war 
before they occur was outlined with the CSG transit in 2007, after tensions rose with the 
appointment of a new Taiwan President who ran on a campaign of independence. A higher 
presence of American vessels, like the Strait of Hormuz, could be perceived as American 
aggression by the PRC. Although the strategy of dual deterrence leads the U.S. Navy by a unique 
White House stance, it is clear the White House intends to use the military to reinforce the status 
quo and prevent an escalation between the two countries.   
 The responsibility placed on the U.S. Navy to enforce the international maritime law and 
slow the growing threat of the PRC in the South China Sea is a no-win situation for the U.S. 
Navy. The permissions granted to the Navy have maintained the same appearance: persistent 
presence in the South China Sea, regularly scheduled FONOPs, and dissemination of images of 
the artificial islands. The strategy in the South China Sea has remained the same, just with 
different vessels, for the last four years with no result. The PRC has continued to construct 
airfields, housing, and generally militarize the artificial islands in the face of the Navy. The  
White House’s stance has wavered since the beginning of the construction, with public evidence 
of President Obama backing down when the issue of the South China Sea has been raised. 
Without clear guidance and direction from the President, the Navy has failed to deter any actions 
by the Chinese.   
Conclusion  
  Naval deterrence operations have been successful in enforcing foreign policy when 
appropriately implemented. The delicate balance between soft and hard power is critical to 
international relations under tense conditions. The U.S. Navy has the most success when 
properly and publicly endorsed by the White House. Without a consistent message of support 
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from the President, naval deterrence fails. The Strait of Hormuz is a critical choke point for a 
significant amount of oil transportation, and the U.S. has maintained a consistent presence 
through Strait transits to demonstrate the importance of keeping the Strait open. Since the 
beginning of the transits, the Strait of Hormuz has not been closed, even with the threat from the 
Iranian government.  
In the case of the Taiwan Strait, the Clinton, Bush, and Obama White House did not 
hesitate to straddle a fine line and maintain a balance in accordance with the One China policy 
and the Taiwan Relations Act. Although “dual deterrence” can be tricky, the message was clear 
in how the U.S. Navy implemented the policy and neither Taiwan has declared independence nor 
has China invaded Taiwan.  
Lastly, the PRC’s violation of UNCLOS and American allies’ claims to the area have 
provided unrivaled challenges to naval deterrence operations. Although the Navy has an almost 
constant presence in the Sea, the PRC has continued to create artificial islands and challenge 
legal rulings. With legal justification and a constant presence, a primary difference between the 
successes of naval deterrence in the Strait of Hormuz and Taiwan Strait is the lack of clarity and 
messaging from the White House. If the South China Sea problem is to be taken seriously and 
the U.S. Navy is to enforce the regional demand, more permissions need to be granted, and the 
White House needs to speak frankly about the threat created by the PRC.  
Naval deterrence operations are successful, as long as the White House is consistent and 
sends a clear message as to why the operations are occurring, and what the Navy is deterring. 
From the Cuban Missile Crisis to the Taiwan Strait, having the public support from the White 
House is critical to the success of naval deterrence.    
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Chapter 2: Presidential Kleptocracy and the Department of Defense 
Introduction  
Why are American presidents and vice presidents immune to the Emolument Clauses of 
the Constitution, but all other members of the executive held to them? As the head of the 
government, the president and vice president become kleptocrats by violation of the Emolument 
Clauses and not divesting from their personal finances, specifically by means of the Department 
of Defense (DoD).  
 In the last forty years, all but three members of the White House have divested from their 
financial portfolio: Vice President Richard “Dick” Cheney (R), President Barack Obama (D), 
and President Donald Trump (R). It is a tradition that those running for the country’s highest 
office create a blind trust to free themselves of potential conflicts of interest. In the case of these 
three men, they declined to follow protocol and maintained access to their investments. 
  Unlike other executive members, the Emolument Clauses of the Constitution are not 
enforced for the president (POTUS) and vice president (VP). The Domestic Emolument Clause 
states, “The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a Compensation which 
shall neither be increased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall have been elected, 
and he shall not receive within that Period any other Emolument from the United States, or any 
of them.”88 The Foreign Emolument Clause states that leaders, “without the Consent of the 
Congress, accept any present, Emolument...from any King, Prince, or foreign State.”89 
Traditionally, the judiciary has not enforced this part of the Constitution. The United 
States needs to move past the outdated mindset. Without enforcement of these clauses of the 
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Constitution and divestiture of investments, the POTUS and VP will continue to take advantage 
of their political status. Furthermore, their elevated position allows them to take advantage of the 
DoD for personal gain. Scholars have explored the topic of modern American kleptocracy, but 
no research exists if the executive has personally benefited from the DoD. 
This paper will first dive into kleptocracy: how it is defined and scholars’ criteria to 
determine kleptocratic nature. This chapter explores three case studies: Dick Cheney and 
Halliburton, Barack Obama and U.S. Treasury Bonds, and Donald Trump and the Trump 
Organization. The objective is to determine if these three men were kleptocrats, if they 
specifically used the DoD as a means of personal gain, or if a violation of the Emolument 
Clauses occurred. Lastly, a discussion on how the US should maintain accountability and how 
the POTUS and VP should handle their finances while in office. 
Kleptocracy Theory 
 The word “corruption” often brings to mind dictators who have abused their position for 
personal benefit. However, pinpointing the definition can be difficult. For the sake of simplicity, 
Transparency International’s definition will be used, “the abuse of entrusted power for private 
gain.”90 As a type of corruption, kleptocracy faces the same problem. For additional simplicity, 
this paper uses three scholars’ definitions: Mançur Olson, Susan Rose-Ackerman, and Kelly 
Greenhill, all of whom have backgrounds in political science and economics. 
Mançur Olson introduces the strictest definition of kleptocracy. A kleptocrat is a private 
monopolist or “stationary bandit” and allows a restriction in the goods provided by the 
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government to increase costs for the country leader’s benefit.91 Moreover, a stationary bandit 
will attempt to separate private businesses and the government, while creating a meritocracy to 
operate the businesses. The goal is to create maximum efficiency and approve policies that 
ensure a continuum of profits and decrease the money returning to the hands of the general 
public.92 Additionally, taxation is the only form of profits allowed.93 Overall, kleptocrats desire 
efficiently maximizing profits from taxation for their benefit and the detriment of the public.  
Susan Rose-Ackerman’s definition is significantly less confining than Olson’s of a 
kleptocrat, stating that a strict private monopoly may not be possible. The head of government 
“controls the state but not the entire economy.”94 In contrast, Rose-Ackerman states kleptocracy 
is “the extreme case in which the state is organized purely to maximize the head of state’s 
gains.”95Additionally, the executive and legislative branches can allocate funds or award 
contracts based on what would win them the highest rent.96 
Under her interpretation, the government’s errors hurt the potential profits of the leader. 
Resources are imperfect and inconsistent. The kleptocrat prefers the inefficient state due to more 
opportunities for corruption, making it very difficult to increase profits.97 The additional 
payments to maintain discretion of those who are helping also decrease the profits. Finding 
people who will continue loyalty, and at the same time, making a profit is a difficult feat for 
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kleptocrats. For a realistic kleptocrat, it is impossible to maximize personal profits without 
payouts for silence. 
Lastly, Rose-Ackerman also points to strong kleptocrats desiring to privatize government 
functions, as long as it leads to an increase of profits. The credibility of the privatization is 
critical to its success. As for a weak kleptocrat, it is difficult for them to profit given how 
disorganized and bloated their government may be.98 
 Kelly Greenhill differs greatly on kleptocracy than Olson and Rose-Ackerman. 
Kleptocracy requires an interdependence between corrupt governments and transnational 
criminal organizations (TCOs). TCOs are defined as “structured groups...with the aim of earning 
profits of controlling markets, internal or foreign, by means of violence, intimidation or 
corruption, both in furtherance of criminal activity and in order to infiltrate the legitimate 
economy.”99 Furthermore, she points to transnational trade in the form of direct participation, 
especially by the police or military. This is one of the most worrisome aspects of her definition 
because “corruption will actually tend to determine state goals by shaping the rules or policies 
that state agencies enact or implement.”100 
Moreover, the heads of government appear to fight corruption, all the while continuing 
their profit-making ways. Greenhill outlines the criteria to be considered as a direct participant of 
kleptocratic interdependence with four primary traits:  
“1) A division of political, functional, and social control between state and non-
state actors… 2) a privileging of private gain over the public good- although, in 
cases where states are particularly weak or poorly run, the public may in fact 
benefit from the existence of such relationships; 3) absence or dearth of legal and 
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juridical accountability, and 4) some measure of fusion between the licit and illicit 
economic realms-although each of these comprise will vary across cases.”101 
 
This can create a grey area of what should be tolerated, especially given different national laws. 
The addition of unethical acts to Greenhill’s definition, would further the understanding of 
kleptocracy given how difficult it may be to determine the host nation’s stance versus a TCO’s 
host nation. Kleptocratic interdependence increases globally as barriers to trading fall and 
globalization occurs.  
 Rose-Ackerman, Olson, and Greenhill’s definitions do not have many similarities. All 
agree the executive may create contracts with those willing to engage in corruption. Furthermore, 
privatization of government functions can increase potential profits. Olson believes a stationary 
bandit is unrealistic, as no government can support all taxation going to a kleptocrat. In the case 
of kleptocratic interdependence, Greenhill states kleptocracy only occurs with TCOs. This 
limiting factor hinders the ability to classify other types of corruption. Between the three 
definitions, Rose-Ackerman finds a middle ground that speaks directly to Olson’s perfect 
scenario definition and acknowledges that kleptocracy does not always occur with TCOs.   
 Privatization of contracts fit neatly within all of the scholars' theories; it just depends on 
who is the awardee. Olson takes privatization further by stating the kleptocrat would prefer a 
meritocracy to nepotism to ensure maximum profits with the best experience. This directly 
speaks to Rose-Ackerman’s concern about inefficiencies, as those selected under a merit-based 
system would address those issues.  
 Finally, the four-part criteria provided by Greenhill compliments the other two definitions 
nicely. The requirements under Rose-Ackerman’s definition allows analysis to acknowledge the 
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shortcomings of governments and the difficulty of creating rents in an imperfect system. The 
need for a stable, merit-based government that offers their citizens services, yet finds a way to 
privatize and maximize profits would be an ideal scenario for a kleptocrat. This encompasses the 
stationary bandit of Olson, the strong kleptocrat of Rose-Ackerman, and subject to the criteria 
provided by Greenhill. 
Case Study: Richard Cheney 
 Richard “Dick” Cheney is a career politician who rose through the ranks of government 
starting in 1966. By 1989, he was uprooted from Congress and selected to be George Bush’s 
Secretary of Defense (SecDef). Cheney’s twenty years between the White House and Congress 
proved invaluable with his Washington, D.C. connections. His top priority was to privatize the 
military’s logistic capabilities. This reduced the military by a half million service members by 
moving the workload to defense contracting companies. Kellogg Brown and Root won the novel 
contract for international logistic support to the U.S. military.102 During this time, Operation 
Desert Storm emerged as a pivotal moment that put Cheney’s privatization to the test. He hired 
Halliburton, a company with close ties to the DoD. Kellogg Brown and Root was a subsidiary of 
Halliburton, and those two companies kept him in mind when President Bush voted out of office.  
 With President Clinton’s election, Cheney’s time in Washington, D.C. appeared to be 
over. In search of a new job, he eventually became hand-selected to become the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) for Halliburton. Halliburton recognized his vast network across political parties, 
as an alumnus of the White House. He worked tirelessly to grow the relationship with the DoD. 
Eventually, Halliburton was awarded $2.3 billion of federal contracts and $1.5 billion in 
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taxpayer-insured loans.103 He acquired Dresser Industries, a company that had previously had 
contracts with Saddam Hussein and the Ayatollahs of Iran.104 This acquisition created a $17 
billion company and became the world’s largest oil-field industry.105 
By the time Cheney left his position at Halliburton for Vice President, stock was at an all-
time high. During his time as Vice President, he received $150,000 a year for deferred 
compensation and maintained 230,000 shares of Halliburton stock.106 In addition to his holdings, 
he received a stock payoff of about $37 million. 
 Once in office, he put friends, like Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz, into the 
Pentagon to conduct his bidding. From 2002-2003, Cheney publicly remarked on the growing 
threats of Saddam Hussein’s arsenal of nuclear weapons. The growing concern helped the 
political and public sphere to support the invasion into Iraq. With war looming, it was only 
logical to award contracts to Halliburton. It is widely known that intelligence during this time 
was fabricated to sew a fictitious narrative together to support going to war in Iraq. Several 
reports from the Intelligence Community provided the White House with information that did 
not support the Weapons of Mass Destruction narrative pushed by Cheney.107 
Most American companies were prohibited from doing business with Saddam’s regime, 
Halliburton found a workaround. Instead, Halliburton was awarded a no-bid contract for two 
years for $7 billion before any American military arrived.108 The Pentagon stated that a public 
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bid would have given away classified war plans.109 The competitors who had Gulf War 
experience requested to submit bids were told that their services were not required. Before 
Cheney’s time as Defense Secretary, the military would have completed this work. 
Furthering profits, Halliburton raised the price of gas by more than twice the amount of 
competitors. A New York Times reporter, Don van Natta, Jr., assessed:  
“A company's profits on the transport and sale of gasoline are usually razor-thin, 
with companies losing contracts if they overbid by half a penny a gallon… 
Halliburton's percentage of its gas importation contract said the company's 26-
cent charge per gallon of gas from Kuwait appeared to be extremely high.”110 
 
Halliburton justified the cost, stating heightened danger in transporting the gas and the costly 
overhead. Overall, the Bush Administration awarded Halliburton $8 billion in contracts for its 
work in Iraq.111 Cheney never divested from his 230,000 stock options worth more than $10 
million112 and earned almost $2 million from Halliburton from 2000-2008.113 In all, Wil S. 
Hylton said it best, “the Vice President has repeatedly promoted the interests of a corporation, 
Halliburton, over the interests of the nation, causing untold harm to American economic, 
military, and public health.”114  
 Halliburton’s actions did have consequences. In 2003, the company came under review 
for favorable defense contracts from the Pentagon. Later that year, the Defense Contract Audit 
Agency found sufficient evidence that Halliburton overcharged and defrauded the government 
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over $100 million worth of resources.115 Keep in mind, the man at the helm, Donald Rumsfeld, 
was a close friend and personally selected by Dick Cheney. Together, they conspired to move 
more business to the Middle East with false intelligence reports approved by the Pentagon, 
where Halliburton had a higher likelihood of earning contracts.  
 In 2010, two years after leaving office as Vice President, Dick Cheney had a warrant for 
his arrest by the Nigerian Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, their anti-corruption 
organization, for bribery and corruption. Halliburton constructed a liquefied natural gas plant in 
the Nigerian Delta after offering $180 million in bribes to Nigerian politicians from 1994-2004, a 
majority of which was under Cheney’s purview as CEO. Halliburton pleaded guilty to the 
bribery charges in 2009, but Nigeria wanted Cheney to be held accountable.116 After a month of 
private negotiations that involved former President George H.W. Bush (R) and Halliburton 
representatives, the charges were dropped. Halliburton agreed to pay $250 million to clear the 
name of the former CEO and several other officials.117  
Analysis: Richard Cheney 
The act of kleptocracy requires a head of government and the theft of money, in this case 
the DoD. The Constitution explicitly states that no member of the executive shall receive any 
emoluments during their time in office. In the case of Dick Cheney, his history of civil service 
granted him insight into profiteering and networking across the government. While SecDef, 
Cheney significantly reduced the footprint and capabilities of the military by privatization. His 
experience led to the opportunities of future deals, like Halliburton.  
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 His time as the SecDef led to a comprehensive and exclusive network that offered access 
with an established reputation, even with no business experience. Cheney not only brought an 
extensive background to the table but a significant win in his resume with the short Gulf War and 
the rolodex of Middle Eastern leaders. His addition to the company expanded its reach into the 
Middle East and Africa. The lack of experience in running a multibillion-dollar company was 
overlooked by the board when it was evident that gaining Cheney’s name was an investment.  
 The intelligence which supported the invasion of Iraq was fictitious, and Cheney and 
Rumsfeld created the Pentagon office that fabricated those reports. Moreover, Halliburton was 
awarded no-bid contracts prior to the announcement of the invasion. Cheney found a surefire 
way to ensure his previous company, one that he still had a significant investment in, could profit 
from his time in office. 
 Olson’s definition of kleptocracy discusses the stationary bandit who uses a private 
monopoly to create profits from the government through taxation. During Cheney’s time as 
SecDef, he privatized much of the military and granted many defense contracts. According to 
Olson, “a stationary bandit has an encompassing interest in the territory he controls and 
accordingly provides domestic control.”118 Although it is not clear if Cheney’s actions were 
meant to benefit him after the White House, the privatization appealed to all contracting 
companies. This policy change also meant a decrease in military capability. Before tenure as 
SecDef, the military could accomplish the tasks for which Halliburton was contracted. However, 
a monopoly of profits is impossible with a myriad shareholders in Halliburton. Given the sizable 
amount of shares that Cheney held, he still made a significant profit.  
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Olson calls for a meritocracy under his kleptocracy definition. The no-bid contract of 
Halliburton did not allow others to compete. Competitors were allegedly left in the dark due to 
the classification of the project. In comparison Cheney placed confidants in the Pentagon that 
ensured success of his objectives. This could be seen as a minimal form of meritocracy in terms 
of Cheney’s desires coming to fruition more efficiently. Lastly, Olson requires rents from 
taxation, which did not occur. Cheney only received his profits through payment from 
Halliburton and his shareholdings. Under Olson’s definition of kleptocrat, Cheney partially fits 
into the definition. While Cheney successfully privatized part of the military, it was neither a 
monopoly nor a true meritocracy.  
Rose-Ackerman states that a kleptocracy is an extreme state strictly organized for 
maximum rents. She specifically calls out awarding contracts to ensure maximum gains for the 
heads of government, of which Cheney did just that. The contracts awarded to Halliburton were 
grossly over the price point needed in Iraq. So much so, Halliburton successfully doubled the 
price of fuel with no competition. The facade of overhead and danger pay was previously 
unheard of and could have been mitigated by competitive bidding.  
 Rose-Ackerman discusses a loyal base of the kleptocrat, stating their unquestioning 
attitude. A majority of the American people after September 11, 2001 wanted justice through 
whatever means possible. The erroneous intelligence cited by the Bush Administration was 
enough for Americans to have an unquestioning attitude. Additionally, Cheney’s strategically 
placed friends, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz, ensured the Pentagon could provide the supporting 
documentation for the invasion into Iraq.  
However, the inefficiencies cited by Rose-Ackerman’s definition fall short. Halliburton’s 
shareholders provided input to the board. Contrary to Rose-Ackerman’s definition, those 
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inefficiencies of other shareholders may have cut into Cheney’s maximum rents, but the $2 
million earned and the 230,000 stock options still provided a significant profit. Additionally, no 
evidence exists that Cheney’s payout was shared with anyone other than possibly his family. 
Overall, Dick Cheney partially fits into Rose-Ackerman’s definition of a kleptocrat. Cheney 
successfully awarded contracts to a company that offered a significant profit, regardless of the 
inefficiencies. Cheney maintained an incredibly loyal base that provided cause for him to award 
said contracts, all the while, never dividing his shareholdings. 
 As for Greenhill, she provided a four-part criterion that assists in determining if Cheney 
falls into her definition of kleptocrat. First, the appropriate division exists between the state and 
non-state actors, given the fact that Cheney occupied the role of Vice President from 2001-2009.  
Second, private gain over public benefit occurred when he misused taxpayer money by 
not allowing competition. Cheney granted Halliburton a no-bid contract and had he allowed bids, 
the taxpayers would have almost certainly saved money. Instead, Cheney personally benefited 
through his stock holdings. Although Greenhill suggests under a weak government that the 
public could benefit from the private gain, this scenario does not fit.  
Third, the absence of legal accountability is prevalent throughout his time as Vice 
President. The Justice Department fined Halliburton for fraudulent charges during his time as 
CEO, but Cheney did not face personal accountability. Similarly, the contracts awarded before 
the war in Iraq allowed Halliburton to defraud the government over $100 million.119 Other than 
hits to their reputations, neither Cheney nor Rumsfeld had charges brought against them for their 
influence over the fictitious intelligence or showing favor to Halliburton.  
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Lastly, Greenhill states that a fusion of legal and illegal actions took place. Cheney was 
cautious in ensuring his actions followed the letter of the law, knowing the Constitution's 
Emolument Clauses has never been enforced. Greenhill also states that a kleptocrat operates with 
a TCO, which Halliburton can fit that description. The U.S., Indonesian, and Nigerian 
governments charged Halliburton for separate but comparable crimes of corruption and bribery, 
thus fitting into Greenhill’s definition. Overall, Vice President Cheney fits into four of the five 
criteria as a definition of kleptocrat.  
Case Study: Barack Obama 
 Barack Obama is the first African American to win the presidency. He spent only twelve 
years in politics when he was elected to the White House in 2008. He successfully won 
reelection, serving eight years as the 44th president. Once taking office, Obama decided not to 
use a blind trust, the first president in over forty years to decline to do so. According to a White 
House spokesperson, “The choice not to have a blind trust is an effort to be transparent about 
where his money is kept, and the public can see his latest financial disclosure documents, which 
we have made public.”
120 He instead decided to sell his stock portfolio and transition his 
investments to U.S. treasury bonds.121  
Conflicts of interest and financial benefits of his political stature had previously created a 
need to investigate his finances. The Federal Election Commission (FEC) investigated his 
mortgage during his tenure as senator, when he allegedly used his office to receive a lower 
interest rate. The complaint lodged against the Obamas sited other comparable mortgage rates, of 
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which the Obamas received a significant discount, allegedly resulting in over $100,000 saved 
over thirty years. The FEC later dismissed the case, finding that the Obamas were a successful 
couple and wanted to create a long-term investment relationship.122 Eight of the fourteen other 
mortgage loans given by the bank to similar couples resulted in a discount.123 
 The investigation left a lasting impact on the Obamas. So much so, that when the 
economic collapse of 2008 saw lower interest rates, Barack Obama made it clear he would not 
refinance. During a Town Hall in Los Angeles, Obama remarked, “Our home back in Chicago, 
my mortgage interest rate, I would probably benefit from refinancing right now...When you're 
President, you have to be a little careful about these transactions, so we haven't refinanced.”124 
 The transparency President Obama strived to maintain for his loans and his financial 
portfolio also included his tax returns published on the official White House website. In 2015, 
for example, his tax returns showed earning $1,686 from his treasury bonds.125 Other reports 
from his tax returns show the majority of his earnings since 2005 derive from the two books he 
authored prior to his presidency. He made about $7.5 million in book deals. Profits since taking 
office, making up 75% of all Barack and Michelle Obama’s earnings.126 The other earnings came 
from Obama’s presidential salary.  
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 While Barack Obama was in office, he declined to follow his predecessors' traditional 
ways by divesting from his portfolio. He achieved his promise to conduct his time in office with 
maximum transparency by publishing his tax returns and, most importantly, moving his stock 
portfolio to treasury bonds. He also ensured he did not take advantage of the recession by 
refinancing. However, he still profited considerably from his books, violating the Domestic 
Emolument Clause. Obama’s time in the Senate taught him a lesson for his time as president and 
helped create an avenue that would not financially benefit from his political influence.  
Analysis: Barack Obama  
The president's office can influence the market by signing new policies, executive orders, 
or diplomatic discussions. However, Obama’s tax returns show a very modest return on 
investment of less than $2000 per year. Additionally, treasury bonds traditionally have a low 
return on investment and are open to the public, making an investment a safer option if deciding 
not to divest. 
 According to Olson’s definition of a kleptocrat, the taxes received from the American 
people between 2009 to 2017 show no evidence of supporting Obama as a stationary bandit. 
Obama did not further privatize the military after the Bush administration. Olson’s definition 
creates a need for privatization that leads to profits for the head of government through taxation.  
In this case, this administration has no account of conducting themselves in this fashion.  
As for Rose-Ackerman, Obama fails to meet the criterion set forth by her definition. 
Obama did not organize the U.S. to ensure maximum gains during his tenure, especially in the 
case of treasury bonds. No evidence has been found suggesting he has created new inefficiencies 
to create a new avenue of personal wealth nor has a devoted base been discovered that reaped 
from the benefits of his presidency.  
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Using Kelly Greenhill's criteria, the first question determined there was no division 
between state and non-state actors. He moved his assets into US treasury bonds, controlled by 
the Treasury Department. While a president may influence the bonds' value during their time in 
office, bond percentages were consistently low. Between 2009 to 2017, the highest return rose to 
4.01% in 2010; however, most of his time in office hovered around 2.25%.127 There is no 
evidence that Obama used his influence to create a higher return on investment for himself. 
Second, as stated previously, no privilege of private gain existed over the private good. 
Anyone can purchase treasury bonds, therefore, could receive the same percentage of benefits 
Obama earned. The public did not suffer as a consequence of his investment in bonds, and there 
was no misappropriation of funds toward his investments.  
Third, given the transparency of all of his tax returns via the White House website, any 
judicial challenge was possible. Even before his presidential campaign, watch groups already 
challenged his financial background, like his mortgage rate. While the FEC found no 
wrongdoing or preferential treatment, the need for transparency when there is no blind trust set 
up is critical. Anyone with an internet connection and the ability to call their congressperson 
could evaluate his tax returns and send a letter of concern to their elected representative. An 
opportunity existed for all those who wanted to ensure accountability. 
Lastly, no evidence of illicit economic advantage surfaced during or after the Obama 
administration. Obama's case fails to meet Greenhill’s definition of kleptocratic interdependence 
with no use or financial gain with a TCO. With his administration’s pledge of transparency, it is 
clear that no evident fusion between the legal and illegal realm became intertwined. Overall, 
Obama does not fit the role as a kleptocrat according to Greenhill’s definition. 
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Under the selected definitions by Rose-Ackerman, Greenhill, and Olson, Barack Obama 
does not fill the profile as a kleptocrat during his time as president. While he conducted his 
finances in an unusual manner, his tax returns show only a modest gain from his investment in 
U.S. treasury bonds. Furthermore, there is no evidence of him specifically adding personal gain 
from the U.S. military under his role as the Commander-in-Chief. The transparency that Obama 
sought, and the public observed shows that a complete divestiture of finances is not completely 
necessary.  However, he did violate the Domestic Emolument Clause by receiving profits other 
than his congressionally approved presidential salary.  
Case Study: Donald Trump 
 Donald J. Trump was born into a family with a highly successful real estate business. 
When he became CEO, he renamed the company “The Trump Organization,” and it grew to 
encompass hotels, golf resorts, and commercial buildings. After his inauguration in 2017, Trump 
gave up his role at the Trump Organization and made his two sons, Donald Jr. and Eric, the co-
executive vice presidents. Setting up a blind trust would not be feasible with his sons at the helm. 
Both sons publicly remarked that they regularly update their father on business deals and their 
associated assets.128 Unlike previous presidents, Trump decided not to give up his financial 
stakes in his namesake business. Although it is a private organization, he publicly discussed how 
he could stay president of both the United States and the Trump Organization; however, he did 
not like how it would appear to the public. 129  
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 After taking office, President Trump took advantage of the real estate empire that he 
grew. While in office, he often stayed at properties he owned, whether it is the “Southern White 
House” at Mar-a-Lago Club in Palm Beach, Florida, or the Trump National Golf Club in 
Bedminster, New Jersey. As of his 1,374th day in office (Oct. 25, 2020), he had spent 378 days 
at his property rather than the White House or another presidential location, like Camp David.130  
According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), when traveling to any 
location, the president is required to travel on a DoD aircraft.131 The two military aircraft used by 
the president are Air Force One and Marine One, depending on the distance of the travel 
required.  Additionally, the DoD is required, as per the Presidential Protection Assistance Act, to 
“provide such assistance on a temporary basis without reimbursement when assisting the Secret 
Service in its duties directly related to the protection of the President or the Vice President. 
[emphasis added]”132  The Secret Service is charged with the protection of the president, vice 
president, and immediate family members.133  However, the Secret Service does not fall under 
the DoD, rather the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The law dictates that the president 
is obligated to travel by DoD aircraft.134  
The GAO found that during four trips to Mar-a-Lago, the DoD incurred $8.468 million to 
support the president’s travels from February 3, 2017 to March 5, 2017.135 Of note, this figure 
does not include classified costs and the salaries of the servicemen and women who support the 
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operations. In contrast, the DHS and the Secret Service footed $5.071 million for the same travel. 
Part of those costs included $24,414.70 paid to Mar-a-Lago for the military to stay at the Trump-
owned resort.136 To be fair, President Trump could not charter his own flights for these trips, but 
the amount of travel spent at his properties is notable. His most frequented Trump property was 
Mar-a-Lago, spending 133 days conducting “work vacations” and 99 days at Bedminster, New 
Jersey under the same justification.137 As of October 25, 2020, Trump made 32 trips to Mar-a-
Lago during his tenure in office.  
With no further documentation provided by the GAO, one can estimate that Trump’s trips 
alone to Mar-a-Lago led to the DoD billed $67.744 million.138 The price of flying on Air Force 
One is approximately $180,000 per hour, so while the GAO has not published a report on his 
travels to Bedminster, it would approximately cost the DoD $360,000 per round trip.139  
Previous presidents conducted similar working vacations, but none to a resort property 
they own. Additionally, trips for other presidents, like President Barack Obama, to a similar 
distance as Washington DC to Mar-a-Lago tallied to $2.839 million for two trips charged to the 
DoD, equaling approximately $5.678 million if it was four trips.140 Furthermore, past presidents 
usually take their time away from the White House at Camp David, offering “solitude and 
tranquility” while situated only sixty miles from the White House.141  
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Additionally, whenever Trump stayed at a hotel, the security detail was required to stay 
in the same location, which guarantees higher occupancy for the Trump Organization resort. The 
average night for the detail was $400 to $650 per night, while at Bedminster, they were charged 
a flat rate of $17,000 per month.142 Meanwhile, the cost to the DoD for lodging, meals, and 
miscellaneous costs charged by the Trump Organization is unknown.  
The first lady, Melania Trump, and their son, Barron, decided to reside in Trump Tower 
in New York City. As part of the first family, they must have a secret service detail and, most 
likely classified, services of the DoD. The DoD and DHS needed to lease a floor at Trump 
Tower to ensure the family's safety, costing about $1.5 million a year and returning to the 
pocketbooks of the Trump Organization.143 Overall, Anita Kumar put it best when trying to 
determine how much money is spent and from which organizations, “There’s no way to 
determine how much in total the administration is spending because no single entity tracks that 
money.”144 
One significant incident during Trump’s tenure in office resulted in his impeachment. On 
December 18, 2019, President Trump was impeached for high crimes and misdemeanors by the 
House of Representatives. Trump and his associates solicited help from Ukraine's government to 
investigate presidential candidate Joe Biden. Trump attempted to suspend $391 million of 
military aid and security assistance already allocated by Congress.145 While this case did not 
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outrightly benefit the Trump Organization, it intended to keep Trump in the White House for an 
additional four years. Those four years could have led to similar travel costs, barring any 
inflation, by President Trump to his properties owned by the Trump Organization.  
Analysis: Donald Trump 
 The definition of a kleptocrat set forth by Olson requires the head of government to 
decrease the availability of goods while driving up the costs of said goods to ensure profits. In 
Trump's case, he did not outright reduce any products' availability, but he did decrease the 
locations where he was willing to stay. As previously mentioned, Trump was the only president 
to vacation and work at his own commercial properties. By not allowing other locations to be an 
option, he ensured exclusivity of the goods he was willing the government to purchase on his 
behalf. The funneling of those funds to the Trump Organization fit as an extension of Olson’s 
definition of a stationary bandit. 
 However, Olson also states an incentive to separate business and government must exist, 
which is not found in this situation. Trump routinely tried to merge the two and boasted how 
easily he could conduct himself while the head of the two with him at the helm. Lastly, Olson 
states that all profits gained need to derive from taxation, which did not occur during his 
presidency. The DoD personnel that are obligated to stay at Trump properties did not go to the 
Trump Organization through taxation. Overall, in both cases of the Trump Organization and 
Ukraine, Trump does not fit the strict definition of kleptocrat according to Olson.  
 The definition under Rose-Ackerman gives more leeway into who can be considered a 
kleptocrat. Her definition believes kleptocrats can allocate funds or contracts where it best suits 
their profits. Trump ensured most of his days away from the White House were taken at 
properties owned by the Trump Organization. On his 1,374th day in office (Oct. 25, 2020), he 
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spent 378 days staying at his properties. While an actual contract between the White House and 
the Trump Organization did not exist, President Trump had the authority to stay where he 
pleased. He was also aware of the profit margin those stays created under the DoD and Secret 
Service personnel's orders. Military members are subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
if their orders are not followed. Armed with this knowledge, Trump guaranteed room occupancy 
at his properties and whatever other charges, like room service or resort fees, that came with 
staying there. The DoD made payments to the Trump Organization, therefore, the president. 
Rose-Ackerman adds that those profits need to be shared by those who enable the 
kleptocrat to ensure compliance. Trump put his two sons, Eric and Donald Jr., at the Trump 
Organization's forefront. He also employed his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, and his daughter, 
Ivanka, as White House advisors. The nepotism surrounding the White House fits the definition. 
Outside of his family, the threat of termination was all too common. Trump was known to fire 
anyone who speaks out against his actions. While that might not be spreading the profits, the 
potential high-profiled job loss shared a similar effect.  
The last part of Rose-Ackerman’s criteria includes privatization of state abilities. Past 
presidents have taken vacations to other resorts, but again, none of which they owned. 
Additionally, previous presidents have taken time away at the White House at Camp David, 
owned by the government. Instead of the traditional Camp David stay, Trump moved several 
state visits to his properties. He hosted Japanese Prime Minister Shinto Abe and Chinese 
President Xi Jinping at Mar-a-Lago, rather than Camp David or the White House.146 The U.S. 
government owns many properties that are meant to receive foreign leaders and by using Mar-a-
Lago instead ensured privatization.  
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As for Greenhill’s four-part criteria, the first part looks at the “division of political, 
functional, and social control between state and non-state actors.”147 The Trump Organization, as 
a non-state actor, created a significant influence over how and where the president traveled. His 
use of Mar-a-Lago as the “Winter White House” altered how the president hosted foreign 
leaders. The mandatory stay by the Secret Service and the DoD also changed how personnel 
reside while in the service of the president. 
Second, Trump ensured the “privilege of private gain over the public good.” He spent 
almost 30% of his time in office at his personal properties at DoD and DHS expense, therefore, 
the taxpayer. American taxpayers already pay for the White House and Camp David, yet Trump 
determined his properties were better suited. If he stayed at the White House or Camp David, the 
potential cost saved by the DHS and DoD would be quite sizable. 
Third, an absence of accountability, especially by the judiciary, is a grey area. According 
to the law, the president is entitled to the protection and the operations of the DoD. The use of 
Mar-a-Lago to host foreign leaders is a clear violation of the Foreign Emolument Clause. The 
use of Trump Organization resorts to receive payments from foreign leaders and stay at the 
resorts rather than a non-Trump Organization or government-owned property can cause undue 
influence.  
The Trump Organization violated the domestic clause with the continued involvement 
and receipt of benefits. Just in the DoD case, millions of dollars were obligated to the Trump 
Organization every time Trump stayed at one of his properties. Accountability for disregarding 
both the Foreign and Domestic Emolument Clauses has not been enforced by the judicial branch, 
further harming the government's checks and balances. The Citizens for Responsibility and 
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Ethics in Washington (CREW), a government watch group, brought a case against Trump in 
2017; however, dismissed for lack of standing. The judge granted CREW an appeal, which is 
now pending. The District of Columbia filed similar charges for his violation of the clauses.148  
The question of accountability was answered after Trump was impeached for his actions 
in 2019. Although the vote in the House of Representatives fell mostly along party lines, their 
action attempted to maintain checks and balances across the government. The House found that 
Trump used his office and military aid as leverage to urge Ukraine to investigate his political 
rivals. Trump corruptly used the DoD as a pawn in his election campaign and for his personal 
gain. Once again along party lines, the Senate acquitted the president, resulting in no real 
consequence to his impeachment. Overall, several cases of his misuse of his office, both between 
the Emolument Clauses and the impeachment, have lacked any consequence for Trump and the 
Trump Organization.  
Lastly, Greenhill calls for “some fusion between the licit and illicit economic realms.”149 
As stated previously, the use of personal properties for personal gain is against the Constitution. 
Moreover, Ukraine is one of the most corrupt countries in Europe. According to a 2018 USAID 
anti-corruption poll, 92.5% of Ukrainians believed that government and political corruption is a 
severe problem in the country and a top-three issue that citizens faced.150 Trump's request of the 
Ukrainian President, Volodymyr Zelensky, encouraged illicit behavior in a well-known corrupt 
country. Withholding the congressionally approved military aid as quid pro quo with Ukraine 
reinforced illegal economic realms. Especially in this case, there is a problematic entanglement 
of those realms.  
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Overall, Donald Trump fit most of the criteria of a kleptocrat during his presidential 
tenure. Moreover, with the Trump Organization and the request of Ukraine, he misused the DoD 
budget for personal gain. He has not been held accountable, which could happen when he leaves 
office. But until then, he made a significant amount of money during these last four years, 
especially for a man who boasted of not accepting the presidential salary.  
Conclusion  
 Presidents and vice presidents can become kleptocratic during their time in office and 
receive unprecedented benefits, especially from the DoD, when they are not subject to the 
Emolument Clauses and do not divest from their finances. Two of the three case studies highlight 
how to achieve unprecedented personal gain, starting with not divesting from their finances when 
taking office. While Obama did not divest from his finances, his use of treasury bonds did not 
result in any evident kleptocracy.  
 According to the three scholars, Mançur Olson, Susan Rose-Ackerman, and Kelly 
Greenhill, Richard Cheney mostly fits the role as a kleptocrat. Of the three scholars, he fits 
Greenhill’s criteria the most: he worked with a private company with a transnational crime 
history with no legal accountability. He violated the Domestic Emolument clause, thus the 
Constitution by not divesting from him Halliburton shares. Overall, given the vastly different 
definitions of kleptocrat provided, Dick Cheney fits the description of a kleptocrat during his 
time as Vice President.  
Dick Cheney proves that kleptocracy within a president’s administration could have 
successes with little consequences. Like Cheney, Donald Trump found a way to ensure profits 
while in office, contrary to the Constitution. History shows that those in the White House have 
never been prosecuted for that violation. Trump refused to establish a blind trust of his financial 
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assets, allowing him to reap the benefits of the Trump Organization. By continuing to spend 30% 
of his time in office at his properties, which included logistics and protection afforded by the 
DoD, he ensured occupancy at his resorts. Against the scholars' definition, Trump failed to meet 
Olson's standard but met the criteria set forth by Rose-Ackerman and Greenhill. Trump did 
misuse the DoD as a kleptocrat during his presidency and violated the Constitution.  
As for Obama, he failed to meet the kleptocrat criteria set forth by the scholars. While he 
may not have made any profits from the government, specifically the DoD, he made significant 
profits from the books he authored prior to the presidency. He did violate the Domestic 
Emolument Clause without any repercussions.  
To prevent future kleptocracy in the White House, the executive branch should mandate 
the divestiture of financial portfolios and creation of a blind trust. Not only does this create better 
transparency between the White House and the American people, but it also produces fewer 
conflicts of interest. The traditional immunity from the Domestic and Foreign Emolument Clause 
should also end, or an ethics committee should screen all profits. Regardless of political party, all 
three men violated the Constitution. The Senate and House Ethics Committees should review 
those profits to reinforce the checks and balances required by the Constitution. Future studies 
should explore other types of Emolument Clause violations and kleptocracy through the lens of 
other government departments, not just the Department of Defense.  
The Bush and Trump Administrations laid the groundwork for future kleptocracy, and the 
American public is at risk of this behavior becoming a social norm. Regardless of which party 
holds the presidency, the DoD will continue to see funding allocation abuses under the guise of 
classified receipts and executive privilege. All in all, the framework laid out by Rose-Ackerman, 
Olson, and Greenhill can be used as a cautionary tale for the American public. Until Dick 
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Cheney and Donald Trump are held accountable by the American justice system, kleptocracy 
through payments from private companies and stocks will continue to encourage politicians of 
all parties to steal from the public. Kleptocrats are a threat to American democracy; moreover, 






Chapter 3: Presidential Twitter and the Department of Defense 
Introduction 
When the President of the United States (U.S.) uses social media to announce changes 
that impact the Department of Defense (DoD), it undermines the chain of command, creates 
chaos among military members, and jeopardizes relations with allies. As the Commander-in-
Chief (CIC), the President has the constitutional right under Article 2, Section 2, to command the 
armed forces. Command requires dissemination of lawful orders, with or without “the Opinion, 
in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments.”151 
Since the founding of the U.S., how military orders propagate has evolved. Most recently, 
Twitter became the avenue of choice of President Donald J. Trump (R). Most Americans will 
agree that Trump’s use of Twitter was unlike his predecessor, President Barack Obama (D), or 
other world leaders. Trump’s communication style appealed to his conservative voting base, 
which encouraged him to maintain the stream of tweets while in office. Trump’s presidency may 
have been a communication outlier, however, future presidents can still learn valuable lessons. A 
bright line is that a president should not use the @POTUS or a personal Twitter account to 
communicate with the American military without military advisors' careful advice. Without their 
expertise, military members and even allies are put into precarious positions.  
This paper will first dive into presidential agenda setting: how it is defined and scholars’ 
social media observations to control narratives. This chapter then explores three case studies: 
Donald Trump’s Twitter use towards the DoD with Iran, North Korea, and the social issue of the 
transgender ban. The objective is to determine if these three case studies interfered with the 
military, specifically looking at the impact on military leadership, the impact on good order and 
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discipline, and, when appropriate, relationships with allies. Lastly, a discussion on how President 
Biden interacts with his personal and @POTUS account since taking office. This section 
includes recommendations of how to avoid similar social media predicaments of the Trump 
Administration.  
Literature Review: Presidential Agenda Setting 
The role of social media in politics had many individuals optimistic about the direct line 
of communication between politicians and the general public. Anyone with access to the internet 
now had an ability to directly message anyone with a profile. Similarly, it allowed those with a 
following to give short insights into their lives without much censorship. Three scholars, Scott 
Robertson, Stephen Frantzich, and Jefferey Peake, explore the importance of the changing 
atmosphere with politician communication. All the scholars discuss in depth the changing 
political atmosphere with the integration of social media, specifically looking at the role of 
agenda setting by politicians. 
Robertson, in his book, Social Media and Civic Engagement, discusses the modern-day 
town square, the social media sphere where anyone can gather to hear the latest news. This 
transition to the “public sphere,” as he calls it, encompasses the “public transformation of the 
public sphere” and the civic culture in the same realm.152  The public sphere can encompass any 
part of social media, whether a user of Twitter or a Facebook group that someone may belong in. 
The emphasis is on the word “public,” with the growing inability to make anything truly private 
on the internet.  
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One particular theory that Robertson goes into depth is the “Uses and Gratification” 
framework. The goal of Uses and Gratification (U&G) theory is “to explain why individuals 
choose certain media and reject others.”153 This theory is particularly interesting for social 
media, given the multiple avenues to disseminate information. Whether it is through pictures, 
like Instagram, a few sentences, like Twitter, or the combination of both, like Facebook. He finds 
that social media users have four primary needs: “socializing, entertainment, self-seeking status, 
and information.”154 Robertson points to a study conducted in 2011 by Bakker and de Vresse that 
suggests “civic engagement is positively associated with online production.”155  Robertson’s 
discussion has an application to those consuming and disseminating political information 
through social media. He also specifically mentions that the information disseminated through 
social media was not a predictor of said information being factual compared to more traditional 
news sources, like local news broadcasts.156  
The last of Robertson’s theories that applies to this chapter builds on U&G with the 
“Agenda Setting and Framing.” He defines this as “how media attention created a sense of 
salience about certain issues which in turn correlated with their perceived importance.”157  
Especially in the case of politicians, their social media accounts can be used to encourage a 
specific news story and divert attention away from other topics. The amount of attention received 
often depends on the number of followers and the manner in which the information or post is 
 
153 Robertson, Social Media and Civic Engagement, 39. 
154 Ibid., 30. 
155 Tom P. Bakker, and Claes H. de Vreese. “Good News for the Future? Young People, Internet Use, and Political 
Participation.” Communication Research 38, no. 4 (August 2011): 451–70. //doi.org/10.1177/0093650210381738. 
156 Robertson, Social Media and Civic Engagement, 40. 
157 Ibid., 41. 
 73 
disseminated. The better the issue is dramatically “framed,” leads to higher interest and more 
time in traditional news broadcasts.158  
In Stephen E. Frantzich’s book, Presidents and the Media: The Communicator in Chief, 
the theme builds on Robertson discussion and focuses solely on POTUS. As one of the most 
important members of American democracy, the POTUS has a different role with the media. The 
POTUS gets more attention than any other member of the government and has a direct impact on 
foreign policy. Social media has caused presidents to start campaigning throughout their 
presidency, rather than just the run-up to an election, making it hard to distinguish between 
campaign goals or present-day actions.   
To add to Robertson’s discussion of agenda setting, Frantzich suggests that presidents use 
social media to talk specifically to Congress or the media but not to the general public.  First, the 
president’s social media becomes a pulpit of sorts, using their influence to pressure Congress 
into swaying to his will. Second, the president needs to set the agenda through the media, 
because if it is not picked up by a news source, the public is less likely to pay attention. 
According to Frantzich, “Presidents tend to be more successful in setting the agenda on issues 
where there is currently little public concern.”159 The president can utilize their platform to draw 
attention to a topic that is of great concern to them, but the media does not already have a 
narrative due to lack of public interest.  
Social media and agenda setting have not stopped there. The use of Twitter has seen an 
increase in controlling the narrative in addition to targeted pressure.160 The traditional media has 
a responsibility to fact check as a reporting principle, whereas social media has a need to be 
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quick and catchy. Only recently has Twitter and Facebook put disclaimers on “alternate facts” or 
“fake news” that has been proven false. If there is an error in print media, the editor is 
responsible for issuing a correction. That is just not the case with social media. Narrative control 
is especially important because of media bias. According to Frantzich, “Almost two-thirds of the 
public perceives the media as favoring one party or ideology over the other.”161 By 2017, 87% of 
Republicans believed the media was targeted to one side.162 
Frantzich also suggests that with the 24/7 news cycle, it is difficult for the president to 
really control the agenda. Some believe that the president needs to “agenda-surf” the news 
waves.163 Domestic reporters have moved away from covering the White House, sometimes 
making it a struggle to get the attention of those who report the news. The president needs to use 
their 280 characters to catch reporters attention. However, international coverage of the White 
House has increased in recent years.164 
The use of social media has quickened the distribution of the political messages, often 
without the special touch of the previously carefully crafted and edited press releases. Like 
Robertson also suggests, social media allows more people to engage with the political figure. 
However, both authors have a clear concern about misinformation and the echo-chambers that 
the public figure and their followers create. A politician is more likely to have followers who 
tend to have similar beliefs and concerns than those who do not. As Frantzich states, 
“[Followers] look for affirmation of existing biases rather than challenges to their 
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assumptions.”165 The echo-chamber has served as a microphone to further disseminated 
misinformation, bypassing traditional news media that had some degree of fact checking.  
Frantzich then takes a deep dive into the presidential use of Twitter. The first president to 
use Twitter was President Obama, when his team created the @POTUS account in 2008. 
Obama’s tweets were similar to more commonly used press releases: carefully devised and 
checked by experts.166 Obama did not tweet often, and it was less clear if he was the one crafting 
the message and hitting send. His tweets are archived on the Twitter handle @POTUS44 and 
maintained by the National Archives. As for President Trump, “his messages have not been tried 
out on focus groups and reviewed by many levels of the communications staff.”167 Trump’s 
Twitter use was often a pseudo livestream of his inner thoughts. Many of his followers enjoyed 
his use of social media, believing it gave him more authenticity and a look behind the scenes of 
the government. In comparing the two presidents, “Whereas only 22% of President Obama’s 
tweets contained an exclamation point, 59% of President Trump’s tweets used them for 
emphasis. Trump went a step further, using multiple exclamation points in about 10% of his 
tweets.”168 Overall, Obama’s and Trump’s use of the platform was vastly different.  
Frantzich builds on Robertson’s fourth need for U & G: information. Frantzich is 
concerned with five issues with Twitter. First, the dissemination of an accurate and complete 
message with less than 280 characters. Second, the lack of vetting, spell check, and grammatical 
errors can overshadow the true message of the tweet. Third, the almost instantaneous reaction via 
the same platform from whomever a tweet may be targeted. Fourth, the impact on US foreign 
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policy without the engagement of diplomats and the State Department.169 This fourth point is 
specifically important, given those tweets are considered “official statements” from the White 
House and lawful orders for the military. Lastly, the lack of context can make the statement 
confusing and chaotic, especially when a tweet is often disseminated to get traction and a 
reaction.170 
In particular, Frantzich explicitly discusses the role of the military in presidential media. 
He states that the military is often used as a backdrop to an important message, knowing that the 
service members are unable to heckle or give a dissenting opinion. According to Frantzich, the 
military as a prop ensures no “undesirables” will be in the audience and gives an air of strength 
and patriotism.171 In 2018, 80% of Americans had confidence in the military, making this photo 
opportunity an almost certain bet.172 These picturesque moments work well in an era of 24/7 
news coverage and meme-heavy news telling. The growing absence of print media and 
readership encourages people to receive their news in terms of headlines and pictures, rather than 
multi-page articles that might make it above the fold.  
Lastly, Jeffrey Peake, although published in 2001, still makes valid points on the impact 
of presidential agenda setting on foreign policy. He first discusses that presidents cannot really 
set an agenda, because their office is primarily reactive.173 This ties in with Frantzich’s statement 
of agenda-surfing, rather than agenda setting. During the early 2000s, this could have been 
predominantly the case. However, since the rise of social media by political figures, presidents 
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have an opportunity to write attention-grabbing posts. Presidents can now find a way to become 
the news, rather than a victim to the news cycle.  
 Furthermore, Peake states that if Congress and the media are already devoting energy to 
another high salience topic, it will be increasingly difficult for the President to trump the 
attention.174 When issues are less salient, the president has an opportunity for great influence in 
the case of foreign policy.  
 Peake also finds that, “Presidents who clearly establish foreign policy priorities related to 
an issue have greater influence on media and congressional attention than have Presidents with 
unclear priorities.”175 His research used the State of the Union addresses as a means of 
determining how the president gave attention to specific foreign policy issues. While the State of 
the Union is still relevant today, the use of social media as a means to highlight issues is timelier. 
The president needs to pick and choose his foreign policy topics carefully and determine if using 
political currency is worth driving the agenda towards that topic.  
Where all of the authors fail to discuss the impact on the military. Unlike the civilian 
population, the military is subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), where it is 
explicitly discussed that service members are not to engage in politics while in uniform. The 
censorship also relates to Article 88, “Any commissioned officer who uses contemptuous words 
against the President, the Vice President... shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.”176 
Article 88 does not stop with just speech, but it could include social media. Even though each 
member swears an oath to the Constitution, the president still holds immunity from military 
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scrutiny. This oversight makes researching this subject especially difficult, as many decisions 
from the top directly impacts every member of this workforce.  
Service members are allowed to attend political rallies or protests; however, many do not 
participate due to an insufficient understanding of the UCMJ. One group that could be evaluated 
is the impact of presidential use of social media on veterans, who are often more outspoken than 
their active-duty counterparts. On January 6, 2021, the Capitol was overrun by protestors in the 
aftermath of the 2020 presidential election. Many of those who were involved were avid Trump 
supporters, who believed that President Trump should maintain the Oval Office for the next four 
years. According to National Public Radio, nearly one in five rioters were veterans.177 While it is 
incredibly difficult for the public to conduct politics-related studies and polls on active-duty 
military, a focus on veterans could offer great insight into the topic.  
Case Study 1: Donald Trump and Iran  
 Since the 1970s, the relationship between Iran and the United States has been less than 
diplomatically ideal. Since 1980, the U.S. has ceased all formal diplomatic relations with the 
country. President Trump often talked about Iran during his campaign before his 2016 election to 
office, especially in the context of the Joint Comprehensive Point of Action (JCPOA), otherwise 
known as the Iran Nuclear Agreement. By 2018, Trump decided to withdraw the U.S. under the 
notion he could negotiate better terms for the U.S.  
 The tensions continued to rise throughout Trump’s tenure after transportation through 
the Strait of Hormuz was thought to be in jeopardy. In May 2019, several tankers hit limpet 
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mines, which American intelligence pointed to Iranian origins. As a result, the U.S. deployed an 
extra 1,500 service members to the region.178 The next month, a U.S. Navy drone in international 
airspace was shot down. Iran claimed the drone flew into Iranian airspace, constituting an act of 
war. Trump issued further sanctions on Iran as a result after tweeting that his retaliatory military 
plan was not proportional. President Trump also highlighted the importance of continued 
freedom of navigation throughout the Strait of Hormuz, but other countries need to increase their 
defense of the crucial waterway.179   
By December 2019, tensions were at an all-time high when several rockets hit an Iraqi 
base. The base housed Iraqi and American personnel, including U.S. contractors and service 
members. The attack killed one American contractor and wounded several U.S. service 
members.180 On December 27, the U.S. announced that Kataib Hezbollah, an Iran-backed Shia 
militia group, was responsible for the attack. The Pentagon also announced that the Air Force 
conducted five airstrikes against Hezbollah-held bases. Those airstrikes killed 25 Hezbollah 
fighters and wounded many more. Iran denied any relation to the Hezbollah fighters and declared 
the U.S. actions were “terrorism.”181 On December 31, 2019, Iranian-backed protesters attacked 
the U.S. embassy in Baghdad. While no one was hurt, Trump tweeted that Iran would pay for the 
attack.182 
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President Trump’s tweet came to fruition a few days later. On January 3, 2020, Major 
General Qasem Soleimani, the leader of Iran’s paramilitary forces, was assassinated by an 
airstrike. The airstrike also successfully killed the leader of Kataib Hezbollah, Abu Madhi al-
Muhandis.183 Soleimani had a history of targeting Americans and enabling paramilitary groups in 
their pursuit of pro-Iranian causes. Soleimani was viewed as the second most powerful Iranian 
political figure and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei vowed that the US would pay. Iran 
retaliated by launching 16 missiles at American bases in Iraq. While there were no American 
casualties, some infrastructure was destroyed.184 Operation Martyr Soleimani, the name for the 
Iranian attack, came to a halt after Iran mistakenly shot down Ukraine Flight 752, killing 176 
people. The incident stopped any further escalation for a few months.185  
By March, tensions between Iran and the U.S. returned, punctuated by President Trump’s 
Twitter use. During a military exercise in the North Arabian Sea, several armed Iranian boats 
conducted swarming techniques to interfere with the U.S. naval operations. One boat came 
within ten yards of a U.S. vessel, putting the commander into a predicament of inherent right of 
self-defense. The commander decided not to take any action, but the crew recorded the entire 
incident. Iran acknowledged the occurrence and stated that the videos were American theatrics. 
In response, President Trump tweeted, “I have instructed the United States Navy to shoot down 
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and destroy any and all Iranian gunboats if they harass our ships at sea.”186 As the CIC, the tweet 
was a lawful order, however, it was not clear if it changed the established rules of engagement. 
The Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, and Deputy Secretary of Defense, David Norquist, 
publicly acknowledged the tweet and confirmed Trump’s commitment to the protection of U.S. 
military assets. Norquist added that military members needed to be very clear in their 
understanding of the inherent right of self-defense, touching on the ambiguity of Trump’s 
tweet.187 The harassment of U.S. naval vessels by Iran is not uncommon, making the tweet 
especially difficult to distinguish the difference. 
The lawful order tweet later resulted in the USS Boxer, an amphibious naval vessel, to 
use electronic jamming measures to take down an Iranian drone that overflew the ship. The 
drone was accompanied by an Iranian helicopter and several small boats, similar to the March 
incident. The Boxer attempted to contact the drone pilot and the associated vessels to stand 
down, but the Iranians persisted to harass the American ship188. The incident occurred as the 
Boxer was inbound for the Strait of Hormuz, a historically hostile region near Iran. (See chapter 
1.) No personnel were harmed in the destruction of the drone, but it is unknown if the level of 
harassment met the justification of self-defense.  
Analysis: Donald Trump and Iran 
 The following analysis will use Robertson's theory of Users and Gratification (U&G) and 
the four aspects of socializing, entertainment, self-seeking status, and information to determine if 
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the President’s tweets undermined the chain of command, created chaos among military 
members, and jeopardized relations with allies.189 In Iran's case, there have been decades of 
threatening and hostile communication between the two countries. While Twitter may be a new 
form of that communication, the end of diplomatic ties with Iran in 1980 proves how 
complicated history has been. Trump’s tweet on April 22, 2020, “I have instructed the United 
States Navy to shoot down and destroy any and all Iranian gunboats if they harass our ships at 
sea”190 became another low point in those relations. In terms of socializing with Trump's military 
advisors, it is clear that his top advisors (and most of the U.S.) were aware of the rising tensions 
between the two countries.  
The Secretary of Defense, Mark Esper, stated in an interview with National Public Radio 
(NPR) that he and the Joint Chiefs of Staff looked into second and third-order effects. However, 
in the same interview, Esper stated he was unaware of some of the intelligence that supported the 
Soleimani attack.191 Not only was Esper left in the dark about some of the intelligence, but it is 
also unclear when the authorization was approved. The NPR interviewer stated the attack had 
been authorized seven months ago; however, Esper disagreed with this fact. Although these 
briefings and authorizations are highly classified, the White House and the cabinet's message is 
conflicting. In terms of socializing the decision to assassinate Soleimani, the public perception is 
Trump’s Administration was not on the same page.  
Furthermore, the Republican-led Senate passed a resolution to restrict Trump’s ability to 
order military action against Iran. The decision in February 2020 was a direct consequence of the 
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Soleimani killing, of which no one in Congress was notified.192 On March 11, 2020, the House 
passed the same bill. The infamous tweet occurred on April 22, 2020 and by May 6, 2020, 
Trump vetoed the bill limiting his powers.193 Frantzich suggests that presidents use the media to 
speak directly to Congress; in this case, it appears Trump did exactly that.  
The timeline supports the notion that Trump did not socialize his tweet with Congress 
members, especially after Trump publicly stated the bill made the U.S. weak. The Deputy 
Defense Secretary, David L. Norquist, publicly acknowledged the tweet and clarified it did not 
change the regional rules of engagement. Norquist classified the tweet as a warning rather than a 
lawful order to the military.194 The U.S. Navy's rules of engagement do not consider harassment 
a hostile action unless it puts the naval vessel in harm's way. Had Trump received any guidance 
from his military advisors, the tweet's wording would not have conflicted with previously 
standing guidance.  
As for entertainment, 2020 was a lead-up to a presidential election, of which Trump was 
the Republican nominee. Since taking office in 2017, Trump stated he started to campaign for 
reelection after his inauguration. Just as Frantzich suggests, the CIC uses the military 
background to demonstrate power, patriotism, and competency. In the same NPR interview with 
Esper, the interviewer, Ari Shapiro, stated that Trump actively uses the military for a campaign 
background. Esper responded, “The president knows [he should not use the military as a 
campaign device]. The commanders know that others in the White House and the cabinet know 
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that everybody recognizes that we are filling a longstanding tradition of keeping a DoD 
apolitical.”195 However, in 2020, even with the novel coronavirus, Trump used the military as a 
background twelve times between August 1 and December 1, 2020.  
For Trump’s self-seeking status, he had previously mentioned that any delay of his 
Article 2 rights as the CIC would make him appear “weak.” After this event, he vetoed the bill to 
restrict his powers, emphasizing his right to use the military as he sees fit. Especially in an 
election year, it was evident that Trump needed to solidify his status as a powerful president in 
charge of the most robust military in the world. 
In terms of information, the U.S. military is not accustomed to receiving direct orders 
from the CIC without careful articulation of said order. Additionally, those orders are typically 
disseminated through the proper chain of command, even given “warning orders” that an 
operation is coming from the higher echelons. A tweet to share information furthers confusion 
between the intermediate chain of command, which excludes them from any further decision-
making capabilities.  
Overall, it is clear that President Trump did not properly socialize the tweet before its 
dissemination. The verbiage used, specifically “harass,” directly went against the standing rules 
of engagement and the inherent right of self-defense. Although the President had support from 
his advisors during the rising tensions with Iran, the Defense Secretary stated he was not 
included in all intelligence briefings. For entertainment, the assessment might not be classified 
under the correct overarching theme. Trump could claim the news headlines by disseminating a 
bold tweet and emphasized his presidential dominance in an election year. The self-seeking 
status is evident when the tweet happened between passing a bill in the House and Senate to 
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retract some of his military powers and his veto of said bill. The tweet highlighted the power he 
refused to give up.  
The tweet did undermine the chain of command and silenced advisors' capability to 
create a tailored message. The naval vessel commander needed to await further guidance from 
more immediate leaders to determine how to proceed- whether to target an Iranian vessel that is 
harassing the American warship or only target if in the case of self-defense. Disobeying an order 
from the CIC is a grave offense, but it could mean preventing an international incident. If anyone 
had taken the tweet literally, the U.S. and Iran could have seen tensions rise to the levels of 
January 2020, where many believed World War III was a possibility.  
Case Study: Donald Trump and North Korea 
 Just like Iran, President Trump inherited decades old conflict with North Korea. Prior to 
taking office on January 20, 2017, even China warned against escalatory nature from the White 
House. North Korean officials stated that the country was in the final stages of constructing a 
ballistic missile and Trump wanted China to do more to stop the hermit country.196 The stance on 
North Korea after the inauguration continued to deteriorate. For the next few months, North 
Korea continued to test missile capabilities, often boasting about its new capabilities.  
By April 2017, the USS Carl Vinson, a U.S. aircraft carrier, headed to the Western 
Pacific. President Trump joined Fox News to state that the Carl Vison was deployed to the Sea of 
Japan, placing the American sailors in close proximity to North Korea; however, this was not 
true. The Carl Vinson was headed towards Indonesia to conduct a routine naval exercise with the 
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Royal Australian Navy.197 The White House mistake furthered the rhetoric that the US was 
prepared to fight with North Korea.  
Kim alluded to New York City within the maximum distance capable of their newly 
developed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM).198 Coincidentally, North Korea decided to 
test another missile on July 4, 2017 and Trump could not ignore the threat to his hometown. The 
Trump Administration put further sanctions on the country and North Korea vowed to seek 
revenge.  
The latest North Korean threat led to a pivotal statement from President Trump, “[North 
Korea] will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen.”199 In response, North Korea 
threatened to strike the American territory of Guam. The escalation was met with a blunt 
response from the Secretary of Defense, Jim Mattis. Mattis stated that if Kim Jung-Un targeted 
Guam, it would mean the end of Kim’s regime. The back and forth of threats temporarily ceased 
the escalation of words. Trump echoed Mattis’ statement through a tweet, “Military solutions are 
now fully in place, locked and loaded, should North Korea act unwisely. Hopefully Kim Jong Un 
will find another path!”200 
Five weeks later, Trump had the opportunity to address the United Nations for the first 
time as President. He decided to use the new nickname “Rocket Man” for Kim, rather than 
outright calling out the country. On October 1, 2017, Trump tweeted, “I told Rex Tillerson, our 
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wonderful Secretary of State, that he is wasting his time trying to negotiate with Little Rocket 
Man... Save your energy Rex, we'll do what has to be done!” The step back from diplomacy and 
the increased pressure for military action was not lost on the American public. A poll conducted 
by ABC News stated that “Six out of ten Americans were uneasy with Trump’s handling of 
North Korea.”201  
Less than eleven months into his presidency, Trump decided to use name calling as a 
means of communicating with Kim Jong-Un. Kim called Trump an “old lunatic,” which Trump 
responded by saying, “Why would Kim Jong-un insult me by calling me "old," when I would 
NEVER call him "short and fat?" Oh well, I try so hard to be his friend - and maybe someday 
that will happen!”202 During this time, Trump revisited sanctions on North Korea, taking a break 
from the threat of military action.  
With new sanctions in place, Kim returned to using threatening statements of having a 
nuclear button nearby at all times. On January 2, 2018, Trump responded on Twitter, “North 
Korean Leader Kim Jong Un just stated that the “Nuclear Button is on his desk at all times.” Will 
someone from his depleted and food starved regime please inform him that I too have a Nuclear 
Button, but it is a much bigger &, more powerful one than his, and my Button works!”203 After 
two months of little dialogue, the nuclear option was back on the table. The former Chairman of 
the Joint Chief of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, stated that this sort of nuclear brinkmanship with 
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North Korean had never been so close to fruition.204 The button that Trump referred to is often 
called the “nuclear football” which is maintained by a military officer at all times.  
Finally, by the beginning of March 2018, diplomacy prevailed after announcing a 
meeting with North Korea. The meeting, held in June 2018 in Singapore, included discussions of 
denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and future diplomatic relationship between the two 
countries. Trump and Kim met a total of three times during Trump’s tenure as president. 
Analysis: Donald Trump and North Korea  
 In the case of Donald Trump and North Korea, similar to Iran, tensions have been tensed 
for decades, and diplomatic ties strained. President Trump consistently said that the U.S. was 
weak in foreign policy on the hermit country. Even with an escalation of North Korean missile 
launches, President Trump felt it necessary to tweet about the military’s nuclear capabilities. The 
American population had not felt the level of nuclear brinkmanship since the Cold War.  
 The tweets related to the North Korean escalation from late 2017 to March 2018 were 
unlike any previous press release pertaining to nuclear power. Given the sensitivity of this 
rhetoric, it is hard to believe that a member of the White House public affairs team, Secretary of 
Defense, or the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had helped craft the messages. The tweets used similar 
verbiage that Trump often used and responded directly to North Korea's insults lodged at Trump. 
The unique style of communicating and governing even called on the Secretary of State, Rex 
Tillerson, to cease diplomatic avenues.  
 As for entertainment, much of Trump's rhetoric is the same he used on the 2016 
campaign trail. As mentioned previously, after his 2017 inauguration, he immediately started to 
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campaign for 2020. The novel moniker for Kim became a popular joke among the American 
people, especially Trump’s base. The “rocket man” comment made at UN headquarters 
continued to be a rallying cry for a more robust military response against this adversary. At the 
campaign rallies, Trump regularly discussed North Korea, using the playground taunts to 
applause and laughs from his followers. The entertainment success of the North Korean tweets 
was some of the most memorable rhetoric of his tenure in office.  
The self-seeking status is used in the tweet about his bigger nuclear button that “actually 
works.” The strong man approach to foreign policy is not a new concept, and the U.S. has used it 
for decades. However, it has been decades since the U.S. has used nuclear weapons to deter 
escalation. During the Cold War, the message was carefully articulated to be broadcast globally. 
In this case, it appears to have been only to establish personal dominance.  
Lastly, information between countries typically travels through the State Department. As 
mentioned earlier, Trump specifically asked Tillerson to end diplomacy efforts in favor of 
military action. Using Twitter to address a foreign political figure was not new for Trump, given 
he often used it on the 2016 campaign trail. Nonetheless, as a president with a cabinet to address 
foreign issues and publicly asking them to stand back hurts credibility. By asking Tillerson on 
Twitter to “save his energy” decreases diplomacy efforts with North Korea and with any other 
country the US has relations.  
Overall, the use of Twitter during the escalation of the threat of nuclear war cut out the 
military chain of command and the State Department. Those service members in South Korea 
were constantly at the ready due to the escalation on Twitter between North Korea and the U.S. 
The military moved more forces to the area in preparation of a possible declaration of war and 
military exercises were cancelled. The families of those service members also were affected due 
 90 
to the tenuous relationship between the two adversaries. Trump’s tweets directed at North Korea 
not only impacted American service members but the relationship with South Korea, Japan, and 
China. All countries were well within the radius of a North Korean missile, possibly the victim 
of a poorly worded tweet.  
Case Study: Donald Trump and the Transgender Ban 
 During the Obama Administration, the DoD allowed transgender people to openly serve 
in the military. The former Defense Secretary, Chuck Hagel, desired any eligible person who 
wanted to serve should be able to join the military if they met the basic requirements. The 
Administration and the RAND Corporation conducted a study in 2016 that found supporting 
evidence that allowing transgender service members to openly serve had minimal costs to the 
DoD budget. The cost was estimated to be $2.9 million to $4.2 million a year, compared to the 
$534.3 billion budget of 2016.205 In June 2016, the barrier to serve had officially been lifted. 
 On July 26, 2017, despite the evidence provided by the previous administration, President 
Trump announced via Twitter, “After consultation with my Generals and military experts, please 
be advised that the United States Government will not accept or allow Transgender individuals to 
serve in any capacity in the U.S. Military. Our military must be focused on decisive and 
overwhelming victory and cannot be burdened with the tremendous medical costs and disruption 
that transgender in the military would entail. Thank you.”206 Although it is unclear if Trump 
 
205Agnes Gereben Schaeffer, Radha Iyengar Plumb, Srikanth Kadiyala, Jennifer Kavanagh, Charles C. Engel, Kayla 
M. Williams and Amii M. Kress, Assessing the Implications of Allowing Transgender Personnel to Serve Openly. 
Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1530.html.  
206 Donald Trump, Twitter, July 26, 2017 https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?dates=%5B%222017-06-
30%22%2C%222017-07-28%22%5D. 
 91 
actually consulted with any military officials. Many sources point to the upper military echelon 
as being “blindsided” by the decision. 207 
 Trump later cited the high costs associated with the service members, only .00078% of 
the 2016 DoD budget. The decision came at a time when the defense package was set to be in 
Congress but delayed due to conservative Congressmen refusing to vote for it unless the military 
would stop paying for any of transgender medical needs. The tweet occurred while Defense 
Secretary, Jim Mattis, was on vacation and given one day’s notice. Mattis stayed quiet on the 
situation, while other top military officials confirmed there was no plan for the future of the 
transgender military members, emphasizing the surprise.208 Without a plan to move forward, 
transgender service members who were deployed or overseas were put into a predicament with 
many questions going unanswered. 
 The Supreme Court made a decision in January 2019 to allow the ban of transgender 
service members. Those who identified themselves as transgender to their leadership could 
continue to serve, but as their biological sex. For those who refused to continue as their 
biological sex, they would be dismissed from the military. The decision barred any service 
member from transitioning while they are on active duty.209  
 The transgender ban was later reversed by President Joe Biden on January 25, 2021. The 
Biden Administration pointed to the study conducted by the RAND Corporation and the 
feedback from the upper echelons of the military stating there was limited impact on operational 
readiness.  
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Analysis: Donald Trump and Transgender Ban 
 Unlike the previous two case studies, Trump did not direct tweets at another country or 
its leader but a group of Americans. In 2016, President Obama lifted the restrictions on 
transgender service members openly serving in the military. The impetus was placed on those 
who wanted and were physically qualified to serve without restrictions. Unfortunately, this 
policy was unpopular with President Trump’s conservative base.  
 For the tweet's socializing, all new sources confirmed that the decision was a complete 
surprise to the top military leadership. Many of the military advisors felt “blindsided” by the 
massive change in policy. Statements like this suggest that the ban was not socialized by those 
impacted, especially DoD leadership. It took six months to implement the change under the 
Obama Administration, and now with thousands of service members who identified themselves 
as transgender, it would be impossible for their commands to forget their new identity. Trump’s 
decision to change the transgender policy would take months, if not a year, to determine how to 
transition transgender servicemembers out of the service. Additionally, the administration should 
have prepared the delivery of such a change in a different manner. The two-sentence tweet left 
much to be desired and left many affected servicemembers in limbo.  
It is unclear if this was meant to provide any entertainment to the Twitter audience. While 
it appealed to his base, Trump received a lot of backlash from the media for the lack of 
notification to the top brass before hitting send.  
The change's justification elevated Trump’s self-seeking status by emphasizing his 
generals' and military advisors' consultations. By using this verbiage, it presented the decision 
with definitive authority. As mentioned, this part of his tweet was a falsehood, eventually hurting 
his cabinet's credibility. However, it proved he could wreak havoc on thousands of able-bodied 
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service members on the world stage, serving as a warning for any other minority Trump’s base 
might not like.  
Lastly, the information dissemination could have been through the Joint Chiefs of Staff or 
each branch's respective secretary. When the ban was lifted under the previous administration, 
the Defense Secretary, Ash Carter, in a carefully worded press briefing.210 During the brief, 
Carter answered questions from reporters, and the press office released the plan on how to 
integrate the service members once they identified themselves. While every president conducts 
his affairs differently, information dissemination at this level needs proper articulation with 
follow-up information. Twitter with a 280-character maximum fails to do just that. 
Conclusion 
 President Trump's communication style on Twitter to discuss DoD-related concerns 
hindered the chain of command and disrupted good order and discipline. As president and CIC, it 
is their constitutional right to order military forces to conduct themselves as the president sees fit. 
However, given the rapid dissemination of social media, namely Twitter, a leader can send out 
lawful orders without military advisors giving their input. The new technology enables harmful 
and confusing statements to the lowest ranks of the military and, at the same time, catches the 
entire military force off guard and scrambling.  
President Trump was only the second president to use the medium as a primary form of 
communication. Given the novelty of social media technology, no standard for politicians had 
been truly established before taking office. President Obama’s Twitter usage appeared very 
polished and in line with press releases from the White House press briefings. In comparison, 
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Trump’s communication style was an anomaly from previous transitions of media, whether it 
was a fireside chat or televised State of the Union address. No president before Trump spoke to 
the American people with such a constant and unfiltered microphone.  
As Robert E. Neustadt asks and answers in Presidential Power,  
“Suppose such sharp divergences are lacking, suppose most players of the mental 
game see policy objectives much alike, then can [the president] not rely on logic (or on 
charm) to get what he wants? ...This answer is a simple one: Most who share in 
governing have interests of their own beyond the realm of policy objectives.” 211 
 
It is clear that Trump led his administration to literally answer this question by evidence of his 
presidential term. By agenda-setting for most of his tenure in office, President Trump could 
continue to build a persona of a macho-man on the world stage, regardless of policy outcomes. 
While this placed service members, their families, and American allies at risk, it allowed Trump 
to further his self-interest by means of his logic and charm.  
 
President Trump understood the appeal of such unprecedented access and it helped him 
get elected. Trump sought to dominate the news cycle and when it did not view him favorably, 
he deemed it “fake news.” Of all the presidents before him, Trump transitioned from reactive 
agenda-surfing to an offensive agenda setting. Twitter helped Trump stay at the forefront of the 
news cycle with his consistent stream of 280-character thoughts.  
 As fewer elected leaders have a military background, those in power must take time to 
discuss tweets and their second and tertiary effects with military advisors. First, the difference 
between one word, like “harass” and “inherent right of self-defense,” have meaningful 
differences for military commanders. The distinction between the two could further escalate 
measures with American and adversary forces and place allies in an unfavorable position. 
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Second, leaders should avoid nuclear brinkmanship via Twitter at all costs. Undermining the 
State Department and diplomacy efforts in favor of military action should not be discussed over 
social media but in the Oval Office with cabinet members. Third, drastic changes to military 
personnel should be disseminated by the Secretary of Defense, who is in that position to address 
military personnel issues. Employing cabinet members to carry out their assigned duties should 
be encouraged, not hampered.  
Additionally, the UCMJ should revise the criteria listed under Article 90, Willfully 
Disobeying Superior Lawful Order. Currently, the third criteria is “The order must be genuine 
(i.e. not spoofed or faked or otherwise suspect in terms of authenticity).”212 Given the 
vulnerability across all websites, especially a high-profile account like the President’s, it is 
increasingly difficult to determine if a tweet is genuine. Therefore, the UCMJ should add further 
clarification restricting the issuance of a lawful order through social media. 
To prevent any further DoD-related confusion and if any future presidents decide to use 
their Twitter account in this fashion, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of each military 
branch should offer press releases supporting the CIC’s direction in the time immediately 
following. Under the Secretaries’ offices, further information as to how to carry out the lawful 
order or an explanation would provide guidance to their military subordinates.  
  Quantifying the impact of presidential Twitter posts on the DoD is challenging. By 
tradition and necessity, the military is apolitical. Determining the forces’ sentiments is nearly 
impossible, as it is not often researched, especially when it relates to the CIC. For further 
research into the topic, it is recommended to deep dive into the impact of presidential Twitter on 
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the American population and foreign policy. The novelty of Twitter lacks peer-reviewed political 
studies, making this chapter especially difficult to research.   
Since taking office, President Joe Biden (D) has taken the same approach to social media 
as the original Twitter President, President Obama. With less than three months in office, 
Biden’s personal Twitter account, @JoeBiden, mirrors the @POTUS account, oftentimes 
retweeting the latter. The POTUS account under Biden almost exclusively addresses domestic 
issues, and it appears that his staff drafts, verifies, and releases all tweets. Across the board, 
social media's presidential use should be meticulously checked just as any press release would. 
Instead, this chapter serves as a warning of extreme cases that did not help the American purpose 















This thesis explored ways in which the White House can better support American 
military forces and thereby ensure greater national security. The three chapters explore three 
known threats to the DoD by the CIC that ultimately impact national security. Exploration of 
internal threats, rather than external threats, is often overlooked and need further research. 
Overall, this body of research is by no means a complete list of areas in which the president and 
vice president need to rely heavily on military advisors for recommendations and the legislative 
branch for accountability. For example, public messaging in support of naval deterrence in 
conjunction with diplomacy efforts needs close evaluation to ensure the success of international 
intentions. Both the legislative and judicial branches need to maintain checks and balances over 
the executive by closely monitoring for kleptocratic use of the DoD budget. Lastly, the public 
messaging through social media needs to be consistent with strict review and scrutiny before 
dissemination, mainly when directed towards the DoD.  
The first chapter, “Presidential Public Support and Naval Deterrence,” explores the 
impact of public messaging by Presidents Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama in 
support of naval operations. The first case study, the Strait of Hormuz, explores the critical 
waterway that transports 40% of world oil supplies. Iran often threatens to close the Strait with 
its navy or mines. The U.S. Navy maintains a constant presence in the region with a naval base 
in Bahrain and aircraft carriers. The aircraft carriers act as a means of deterrence, reminding Iran 
of the lethal fighter jets onboard and their advanced weapon capabilities. The three presidents all 
publicly stated that closing the Strait in any capacity is a “red line” with severe consequences. 
While there have been skirmishes from 1992 to 2016, the Strait has never been completely 
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closed off. In this case, the public messaging and constant naval deterrence operations have 
helped maintain a critical open waterway.  
The second case study, the Taiwan Strait, found that naval deterrence operations 
supported the One China policy and the Taiwan Relations Act. The delicate balance of 
diplomacy between China and Taiwan and the American presidential messaging that toes the line 
between the two is critical. The American presidents publicly acknowledge the importance of the 
deterrence the U.S. Navy offers. The naval vessels that conduct these operations act as reminders 
of the commitment to neutrality and peace by operating through the middle of the waterway.  
The third case study, the South China Sea, has an almost constant presence of U.S. naval 
vessels operating in the region. However, the three presidents failed to acknowledge the 
deterrence operations publicly. Without presidential support, China continues to create and 
militarize artificial islands, allowing China to claim economic exclusivity of this area. To better 
support the naval deterrence, the president should ratify the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), of which the US is one of a handful that is not a party to the law.  
All three case studies focus strictly on naval deterrence and do not take into consideration 
diplomacy efforts. The State Department plays a significant role in determining how and when 
the U.S. will support specific causes, and in the three case studies, the research fails to identify 
further explanations as to why naval deterrence fails. Further research should explore how other 
U.S. military branches are affected by presidential public messaging. While the U.S. Navy is the 
primary actor for these types of operations, the different military branches have similar 
deterrence missions that do not have the public support of the White House. Notably, the U.S. 
Army’s role in Iraq with the Kurds would be a valuable lesson.  
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The recommendation for the U.S. Government to become a signatory of UNCLOS is 
unlikely. The U.S. is one of only a handful of countries not to observe the international 
agreement, and it would require a two-thirds majority vote in the Senate to become a signatory. 
Although the U.S. helped draft the UNCLOS, it appears there is no appetite to enforce it, as there 
are concerns it could lend to outer space. Without signing or ratifying the UNCLOS, naval 
deterrence operations in the South China Sea will be challenging to enforce, given the U.S. does 
not officially recognize the international agreement.  
 The second chapter, “Presidential Kleptocracy and the Department of Defense,” 
discusses how presidents and vice presidents have a unique position of making personal gains 
from the DoD. Furthermore, the chapter looks at the Constitution's domestic and foreign 
Emolument Clauses and whether presidents and vice presidents violate the clause. The case 
studies explore two presidents and one vice president, the only three since 1980 that did not 
divest from their personal finances before taking office: Richard Cheney, Barack Obama, and 
Donald Trump. 
In the first case, Vice President Richard Cheney worked his entire adult life in 
Washington, DC politics. When Cheney became Vice President under President George W. 
Bush, Cheney did not put his finances into the historical norm blind trust but instead earned 
$150,000 a year for deferred compensation and maintained 230,000 shares of Halliburton stock. 
In addition to his holdings, he received a stock payoff of about $37 million. During his tenure of 
the vice presidency, he ensured through several means that Halliburton would receive no-bid 
contracts, guaranteeing a personal profit. Cheney became a kleptocrat through the DoD as Vice 
President. Although the full figure is unknown due to his status as a private citizen, his actions 
were a clear violation of the Emolument Clauses. 
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In President Barack Obama’s case, he decided not to divest from his financials but placed 
all of his holdings into U.S. treasury bonds. Obama’s tax returns show him earning less than 
$2,000, a small profit from the bonds. However, Obama continued to profit from his authored 
books, violating the domestic Emoluments Clause. Under the criteria used in the chapter, Obama 
failed to meet the criteria as a kleptocrat during his presidency and made no notable gains from 
the DoD.  
In the last case study of chapter two, President Donald Trump maintained a close 
relationship with the Trump Organization business by putting his two sons as co-executive vice 
presidents. Trump also decided not to give up his financial stake in his previous company. 
Trump spent 30% of his tenure in office at Trump Organization properties, which ensured DoD 
spending wherever he stayed. By staying at the resort properties, the DoD paid for travel to and 
from as well as for all possible resort fees that service members encountered while there. Not 
only was this a violation of the domestic Emoluments Clause, but he also invited world leaders 
like Japan’s Shinzo Abe and China’s Xi Jinping to stay at his Florida property, Mar-a-Lago. 
Hosting foreign leaders at locations for personal profit is a violation of the foreign Emoluments 
Clause. All in all, Trump was kleptocratic in nature during his presidency and violated the 
foreign and domestic Emoluments Clause.  
The research for chapter two was limited to public information, namely unclassified DoD 
receipts and tax returns. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) did have public DoD 
spending reports for an Obama trip, which the research shows was not kleptocratic. Obama also 
released his tax returns annually. In Cheney's case, many contracts offered during the early 2000s 
are still classified, limiting what financial facts are available to the public. Cheney’s tax returns 
are limited, not offering a complete picture of what he earned during his time in office. Tax 
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returns for public officials are not required by law to be released, but those in the White House 
have a tradition of doing so. For Trump, he infamously refuses to make public his tax returns. 
Without the tax returns, it is truly difficult to determine how much he profited from his time in 
office. Lastly, the GAO only completed one president travel report for Trump and Obama. Had 
the GAO conducted more, the findings would allow for more data points in the assessment. 
Chapter two has several recommendations, most of which are not feasible. First, the 
president and vice president (and their spouses) should place their finances into a blind trust 
upon taking office. A blind trust ensures that there is no undue influence over the office and 
complies with the Constitution’s Emolument Clauses. Second, the Emolument Clauses need to 
be enforced for the same reason-transparency with no perceived conflict of interest. Anyone in 
elected office can take advantage of the Clauses because they have never been enforced. This 
needs to change. Third, the president and vice president's tax returns should be publicly available 
before taking office and every year in office. The Senate and House Ethics Committees should 
take responsibility for this overhaul. Unfortunately, this level of accountability is unpopular for 
those subject to these recommendations, and selfish human nature will prevent them from 
becoming law.  
Further study of American kleptocracy is critical to maintaining the American ideals of 
democracy and freedom. An ethics committee should closely evaluate each department of the 
government by looking at the president, vice president, and the appointed secretary and their 
financial holdings concerning that department. Many presidents appoint someone with political 
favor to a specific department, making it even more critical to closely observe how they use the 
office.  
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The third chapter, “Presidential Twitter and the Department of Defense,” analyzes how 
presidents use Twitter directed at DoD personnel and the impact it has. The chapter explores 
President Donald J. Trump's tweets, as most can agree that his communication style was an 
anomaly. Trump’s most notable tweets that affected the DoD are related to Iran, North Korea, 
and transgender service members. The analysis finds that presidents should not use their Twitter 
accounts, personal or @POTUS, to address the DoD, as it hinders the military chain of command 
and disrupts good order and discipline.  
In the first case study of the third chapter, Trump directed the U.S. Navy to “shoot down” 
any Iranian gunboats that “harass” American ships. However, the Commander-in-Chief (CIC) 
direction directly contradicted standing rules of engagement in the Strait of Hormuz. The 
guidance all American naval vessels follow is to act in a defensive posture under the inherent 
right of self-defense. The CIC directed the vessels to take an offensive stance and could escalate 
tensions further and possibly constitute an act of war if acted on by the naval commander. No 
military advisors evidently reviewed the tweet, as advisors would have been aware of the careful 
wording and lawful order directed by the CIC. As a result, the entire chain of command between 
President Trump and the naval vessel commander did not have an opportunity to properly review 
the new guidance, creating chaos within the ranks.  
In regard to North Korea, Trump entered a war of words with North Korea’s leader, Kim 
Jung Un. The escalation reached braggadocious heights by Trump stating he had a nuclear button 
on his desk that works. The nuclear brinkmanship over the social media platform was an event 
the US had not seen since the Cold War. The tweets raised the readiness posture in the Asian 
region, changing the American stance towards the hermit country. It put American service 
members at risk and put US allies, like Japan and South Korea, in a precarious position. The 
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series of poorly worded tweets also directed the Secretary of State to step back from diplomacy 
efforts. The consequence of this verbiage hinders the credibility of the department. Overall, the 
tweets escalated the weapons posture for American service members and their allies. It created 
chaos among the ranks and left the upper echelon of the military scrambling to determine how to 
react to the tweets. 
Finally, the last case study explores Trump’s tweet creating the transgender ban from the 
armed forces. Many military advisors stated they were “blindsided” by the decision to kick out 
all the servicemembers that identified as transgender. Although the tweet suggested otherwise, 
no plan existed to remove the transgender members and caught all within the ranks off guard. 
When Obama started the initiative to integrate transgender members into the military, it took six 
months to a year. However, without a clear path forward to dismiss the identified members left 
military leaders in chaos. The tweet ruined the military profession's good order and discipline by 
not having a clear way forward.  
Evidently President Trump decided on the rhetoric used on his Twitter account and 
insisted on maintaining strict control of his tweets. It is not clear if an advisor or friend gave him 
the idea to send those tweets, “But adequate or not, a President’s own choices are the only means 
in his hands of guarding his own prospects for effective influence.”213 At the very least, the 
President cosigned the disseminated messages in order to maintain his influence and speak to his 
base. The manner in which Trump used agenda-setting was dangerous and an inadequate means 
to gain influence — ultimately, Trump’s choice. 
 
213 Neustadt, Presidential Power, 49. 
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Quantifiable data limits the research of chapter three. How does one measure chaos and 
good order and discipline? The analysis allows for qualitative discussion, but it is difficult to 
truly grasp at what level a 280-character message impacts the DoD. Additionally, given the 
armed forces' apolitical nature, studies are limited in determining the sentiments of the different 
sectors of the military. For example, military officers must have a bachelor’s degree or higher, 
and it is unknown if officers follow national voting trends for the same demographic. The same 
exists for enlisted service members who are not required to have a degree. Without this 
information, research into the military personnel becomes a guessing game rather than official 
statistics.  
President Biden has already employed the recommendations from chapter three. Social 
media posts should go through a careful evaluation and review process before dissemination. The 
same scrutiny of a press release should be used for social media posts, as well. The rhetoric used 
on the president’s personal account should be in lockstep with the @POTUS account and vice 
versa. In the case of tweets directed towards the DoD, follow-up plans should be ready for 
dissemination after introducing a policy change. Previous administrations used the Secretary of 
Defense to speak to those plans, which should continue. Although Trump’s tweets serve as an 
extreme case, he is only the second president in history to use this type of communication. Using 
the case studies as a measuring stick as an extreme communication style will hopefully shift 
presidents away from using the medium in this fashion.  
An area of study should move towards the lack of research into the impact of presidential 
social media on the American population. Very few peer-reviewed journals have discussed 
Twitter from the White House and its effect on the American people. As mentioned earlier, 
further studies should look into the sentiments of different parts of the military population and 
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social media’s impact. Although the military is apolitical, service members are highly 
encouraged to vote in any election they chose and follow current events.  
This thesis highlights not only highlights the impacts of the White House on the 
American armed services but on all American taxpayers. As Samuel Huntington discusses in The 
Soldier and the State, the military serves at the pleasure of the CIC, who is democratically 
elected. With that in mind, the American people direct the military by their votes for executive 
office. The executive branch needs to maintain checks and balances by the legislative and 
judicial branches, moreover, accountability by the taxpayers. While some actions in the White 
House may not be illegal, they can qualify as unethical or immoral. The American public needs 
to understand how the White House fails legally, illegally, ethically, and unethically as a matter 
of holding those politicians accountable and the threats that those failures present to national 
security.  
This thesis explores how the White House could improve upon the relationship with the 
DoD, namely publicly supporting naval deterrence operations, transparency in the use of the 
DoD budget, and adequately reviewing tweets that impact the DoD. The president as the CIC 
and the vice president as the second in line have an extraordinary impact on the armed forces. As 
fewer veterans take political office, the disconnect between the military and civilian population 
grows. By no means does every politician need military experience, but those politicians should 
rely on military advisors to bridge the cultural and educational gap. Without taking those 
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